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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Health outcomes are important to economic policy for a variety of reasons. Costs
associated with illness are significant to local, state, and national budgets. Adverse health
conditions impair individuals' productivity in the labor market, and access to health care is a
growing concern for the poor. Impacts to human health associated with air and water
pollution account for the majority of benefits advocating environmental policy. Moreover,
use of health care accounts for a major portion of individual households' consumption set,
and there is a great deal of variation in the interplay between ex ante health risk behavior and
ex post utilization of health care to treat illness.
These reasons, among others, motivate study of health outcomes, health choice, and
health behavior. To complement a varied and growing literature in health economics, this
dissertation is conducted in three substantive parts. The first chapter addresses the effects of
health policy on health outcomes among the poor, while the second looks at individual
heterogeneity in demand for preventative health care, while controlling for individual
differences in lifestyle and attitudinal behavior. The final chapter looks more closely at
factors affecting health risk behavior.
In Chapter II, I investigate the efficacy of public policy on health use and health
outcomes, exploiting variation in the generosity of Medicaid eligibility to low income
pregnant women across states and over time to identify an effect on common, yet costly,
pregnancy complications. Specifically, the question of whether state expansions to Medicaid
have been successful in increasing access to care and improving health remains in dispute.
While some studies find an effect, others argue these fmdings are largely spurious. Moreover,
the extant literature has primarily focused on outcomes related to child health; much less has
been written on Medicaid expansions and maternal health. I provide new evidence on this
important question from a nationally representative sample of hospital discharges for 12
states between 1989 and 2001 provided by the Health Care Utilization Project (HCUP). The
2analysis suggests a lower presentation of infectious disease-related complications among
hospitalizations due to increased Medicaid generosity, and some evidence of a longer length
of hospital stay among pregnancy-related admissions.
In Chapter III, I explore heterogeneity in individual demand for health risk
reductions. Utilizing individual stated-preference data from matching surveys conducted in
both Canada and the United States, I employ the Value of a Statistical Illness Profile
framework to investigate differences in average willingness-to-pay (WTP) for health risk
reductions across the two different cultures. Although existing literature has examined
differences across Canada and the United States allowing for systematic variation with age,
the differences in WTP are not explained through systematic variation across other
sociodemographic characteristics, subjective risks of the diseases in question, or differences
between the Canadian and U.S. health care systems.
I extend the cross-national literature to explain observed differences in individual
WTP for health risk reduction programs by individual heterogeneity in each of these factors.
Controls for these individual characteristics are necessary to prevent cross-national
heterogeneity from showing up as spurious cross-national differences (or lack thereof) in
health preferences. Moreover, from a policy perspective, any WTP number used for benefit-
cost analysis should reflect the actual distribution of characteristics in the at-risk population
for a particular policy or regulation. I fllld evidence of preference heterogeneity, with the
differences largely explained by non-jurisdictional individual characteristics. I find substantial
evidence of age profile effects which are generally consistent with other studies. However,
age profiles with respect to WTP to avoid adverse health states are markedly different
between Canadians and U.S. residents. In general, Canadians have a much flatter age profile
for WTP, and this profile appear to peak at a substantially older age.
Finally, Chapter IV studies factors affecting adolescent health risk behavior.
Previous study flllds that community size and the degree to which social networks are
interconnected (degree of network "closure") affects three economically significant
outcomes: the frequency of adolescent misbehavior in school ("Since school started this
year, how often have you had trouble getting along with other students?"), degree of
perceived safety in school ("How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following
statement: "I feel safe in my school"'), and grade performance, measured by an equally-
-----------------------
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weighted GPA of the student in English, Math, Science, and History. Other research has
suggested peer effects in smoking behavior and drinking behavior. I investigate the degree
to which network closure impacts adolescent health, specifically looking at outcomes for
drinking and smoking, and the degree to which these effects can be disentangled from more
commonly studied peer effects in health behavior.
4CHAPTER II
MEDICAID POLICY AND MATERNAL HEALTH
Access to medical care in the United States has been a topic of significant public
interest since universal care was initially proposed by the Truman administration in the
1950s. To date, universal coverage has yet to be imparted to all Americans, with private-
payer and employer-provided insurance accounting for the majority of coverage for the non-
elderly. Nonetheless, public programs have aimed to fill the gap in access to care for the
uninsured.
Medicaid has historically been the most significant public entitlement program for
insuring the poor. Expansions to the program have been substantiaL While in 1984
Medicaid expenditures totaled a mere $38 billion and covered roughly 22 million people, by
2006, Medicaid outlays totaled nearly $288 billion, covering over 60 million people, including
health insurance for 30 million low income children, as well as long-term and acute care for
roughly 5.6 million of the elderly (I<:.aiser Commission, 2004, and Georgetown University
Health Policy Institute, 2008). In real terms, this represents an annual 7% percent increase
in expenditures over the twenty year period. One of the single largest components of the
Medicaid expansion has been provision of health insurance to low income pregnant women
and children. During the 1980s and 1990s, federal standards of Medicaid income eligibility
were sequentially lowered for low income pregnant women in an effort to increase access to
prenatal and hospital care, and thereby improve health outcomes.
A number of studies have examined changes in the utilization and health outcomes
induced by state-by-state expansions in Medicaid eligibility. In particular, Currie and Gruber
(1996a,b) found that expansions increased utilization of care, and improved health outcomes
through a reduction in the rate of infant and child mortality. Kaestner (1999), on the other
hand, found little evidence of increased prenatal care use, nor improved outcomes for
children, and cites omitted controls for state-specific trends in the prevalence of poverty as
potentially generating spurious results in Currie and Gruber (1996a,b).
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Therefore, the question of whether state expansions to Medicaid have been
successful in increasing access to care and improving health remains in dispute. Moreover,
these studies have primarily focused on outcome effects related to child health; much less
has been written on Medicaid expansions and maternal health. This paper provides new
evidence on this important question from a nationally representative sample of hospital
discharges for 12 states between 1989 and 2001 provided by the Health Care Utilization
Project (HCUP). I employ a similar methodology to Currie and Gruber (1996a,b), but
include controls for the percent of the population in each state in a given year at or below
the federal poverty standard, as suggested by Kaestner (1999).
As a measure of the degree of care provided, I investigate the effects of Medicaid
eligibility expansions on hospital length of stay. Although length of stay may be associated
with either improved or diminished health outcomes through either a lower likelihood of
premature discharge or excess exposure to hospital-induced illness, this measure is an
agnostic indication of the degree of medical care received during hospitalization, as well as
an efficiency measure for hospital care received. Dafny and Gruber (2005) fmd negative
effects on average length of stay for increased eligibility expansions to children, which was
mediated by an increase in the number of procedures performed. However, the literature
has not addressed whether similar effects are observed for pregnancy-related admissions of
adult women. If increases in Medicaid eligibility resulted in primarily inducing coverage and
care for the uninsured, it is plausible that expected reimbursement rates for hospitals
increased as a result of the eligibility expansions. This may lead to an incentive for hospitals
to retain patients longer. On the other hand, if expansions resulted in primarily inducing
low-income privately insured individuals, these expansions may have led to a reduction in
the reimbursement rate for hospital. This may lead to an incentive to shorten the length of
stay for the marginal patient induced onto Medicaid as a result of the state eligibility
expanslOns.
Second, I examine the effects of Medicaid expansions on maternal health outcomes,
which has received relatively little attention in the past. A large literature suggests that
Medicaid expansions have generated limited tangible health benefits due to low take-up rates
and delayed utilization of prenatal care beyond the :first and sometimes second trimester
(Gruber, 2000). Although certain precautionary treatment in the first and second trimester is
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particularly important to reducing complications at birth, even late treatment can offer some
benefit. If left untreated, bacterial diseases such as syphilis, chlamydia and gonorrhea can
result in Pelvic Inflammatory Disease and ectopic pregnancies for the mother, and
premature birth and low birth weight for the child. Since these diseases can be treated well
into the third trimester, and prior to delivery, improved health outcomes can be expected,
even in the case of delayed use of prenatal care services (American Pregnancy Association,
2003).
First stage regression results show that patient take-up of Medicaid coverage varies
across hospital ownership types. An average 15 percent increase in the proportion of the
population eligible for Medicaid between 1989 and 2001 resulted in a 2.3 percent increase in
Medicaid-insured patients at private hospitals and a 1.2 percent increase at non-profit
hospitals, with no statistically significant increase at government hospitals. Length of stay
for Medicaid-financed patients increased on average by 0.13 days as a result of eligibility
expansions over the period. The probability of infectious disease-related hospital admissions
among pregnant women were roughly 0.6 percentage points lower than would have been the
case in the absence of Medicaid expansions.
I begin with a discussion of the background of Medicaid expansions and review the
prior literature in Section 1. Data and methodology for the empirical analysis are then
presented in Section 2, followed by descriptive statistics in Section 3, and results in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
1. Background
Medicaid eligibility was initially linked to the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program. Generally, AFDC was only available to single-parent families,
and in some states the income threshold cutoff for eligibility was quite low. For example, in
North Carolina the AFDC income threshold was set at 29 percent of the federal poverty
standard in 1984, covering only a small fraction of the poor and medically needy (Currie and
Gruber, 1996b). Moffit (1992) reported that the stigma attached with applying for welfare
prevented otherwise eligible people from seeking AFDC, and thereby qualifying for
Medicaid coverage. These limitations were partially offset by state-specific Medically Needy
and Ribicoff programs which, respectively, allowed for 1) netting out medical expenses for
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income eligibility calculations, and 2) extending eligibility to two-parent households.
Nonetheless, attachment of Medicaid eligibility to AFDC program limited access to
Medicaid for many poor families.
Following the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, the tie between AFDC and Medicaid
eligibility was successively weakened. Accompanying this de-linkage was a series of federal
standards for Medicaid eligibility, lifting the income threshold for coverage of low income
pregnant women. Initially, these standards were provisional and non-binding. The 1986
OBRA legislation granted states the option to provide care up to 100 percent of the poverty
line, and a year later, this optional threshold was expanded to up to 185 percent. The 1988
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) required states to adopt a threshold of at least
100 percent of the poverty line, with a two-year phase in period. The required threshold was
increased to 133 percent in 1990, while optional thresholds were expanded to 300 percent in
1997.1 (Gruber, 2000)
States responded differentially to these federal mandates - both in terms of the
timing of implementation and the generosity of the income threshold. Figure 1 shows
adopted threshold levels by state in 1989, 1995 and 2001, after most of the state-wide
expansions had been implemented. Higher eligibility thresholds were adopted in the
Northeast and Southwest, while many states in the Northwest, Central and Southern United
States were less quick to respond, and imposed generally lower income thresholds.
1 Although the l'vICCA was repealed in November of 1989, the 133 percent threshold mandate was carried on
by the 1989 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.
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Figure 1: Medicaid Eligibility as a Percent of Federal Poverty Line 1989, 1995, and 2001
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1.1. Coverage and Health Outcomes
A number of studies have indicated that Medicaid coverage, at least relative to a lack
of insurance altogether, does increase utilization and improve health outcomes, particularly
infant health outcomes. The uninsured are less likely to seek hospital care, and exhibit worse
health outcomes (I(asper, 1986; Short and Lefkowitz, 1992). However, ascribing a causal
effect to these findings is complicated by the fact that the uninsured differ from the insured
in a number ofways that are correlated with both utilization and health outcomes. For
example, the uninsured are more likely to be less educated and of lower incomes, both of
which are presumably negatively correlated with health care utilization and good health.
Moreover, health status and insurance coverage are correlated as well; those knowingly in
need of medical care have an incentive to seek out insurance, which is the basis of much of
the adverse selection literature.
To address these issues, several studies have isolated the effect of Medicaid policy
changes within a single state before and after policy implementation. Piper et al. (1990)
studies Tennessee's 1985 extension of Medicaid to low income married women. Haas,
Udarhelyi, and Epstein (1993) examine the changes in the use of prenatal care and infant
birth outcomes surrounding the 1985 Healthy Start program in Massachusetts, which
provided health coverage to uninsured pregnant women with incomes at or below 185
percent of the federal poverty line. Epstein and Newhouse (1998) focus on expansions in
coverage to women in California and South Carolina in 1989 using a linked dataset of
hospital discharges and birth registries.
These studies fail to identify significant improvements in infant health outcomes as a
result of Medicaid eligibility expansions. Gruber (2000) posits that the failure to find a
significant effect on infant health in state-specific studies is due to two primary reasons.
First, the prenatal care literature has advocated first-trimester care as the most important for
improving fetal development. Creasy, Gummer, and Liggins (1980) found that over 60
percent of preterm births (the leading cause of low birth-weight deliveries) could have been
identified with an initial prenatal care screening. Furthermore, relying on results from a
series of clinical trials, the Institute of Medicine's 1985 report found that providing
appropriate prenatal care, including screenings of complications associated with preterm
delivery, could reduce the incidence of low birth-weight by 20 percent.
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Even though economists have cautioned that self-selection may bias estimated
effects in health outcomes, economic-based studies have still found a (smaller) effect of
prenatal care use in decreasing the incidence of low birth weight (Rosenzweig and Schultz
1982, 1983, and 1988; Corman, Joyce, and Grossman 1987; Grossman and Joyce 1990; and
Frank et al. 1991). However, given low take up of Medicaid and associated prenatal care by
recently eligible women, it should not be surprising that use of prenatal care is often delayed
until after the first, and sometimes well into the third, trimester. Piper (1990) found that
more than two-thirds of eligible women enrolled in Medicaid after the fIrst trimester, and a
sizable 30 percent waited until after 30 days prior to expected delivery.
The second reason for lack of apparent effects on infant health relates to the nature
of the design of these early studies. Since they focus on patterns before and after a policy
change within a given state, these studies impose the identifying restriction that there were
no other trends within a given state over time that were correlated with prenatal care use and
infant health. For example, real incomes were declining over the 1980s, which is most likely
correlated with prenatal care use, as well as fetal health. Moreover, state specifIc responses
in utilization and efflcacy of care mayor may not be representative of the effects of national
Medicaid policy as a whole.
Currie and Gruber (1996a) examine the effects of Medicaid expansions on prenatal
care use and infant outcomes, while Currie and Gruber (1996b) study similar outcomes for
child heath care use and associated outcomes. Exploiting cross-sectional variation across
multiple states over time, they are able to control for national trends over time, and non-
varying state-specifIc characteristics, as well as claim nationally representative results. They
report that the average 30 percentage point increase in eligibility for Medicaid between 1979
and 1992 led to a 1.9 percent reduction in the probability oflow birth weight, and an 8.5
percent reduction in the likelihood of infant mortality, despite prevailing evidence of delay in
the trimester in which prenatal care is started. While the low birth weight flnding was weakly
signifIcant (at the 10 percent level), the lower infant mortality was strongly signifIcant and
robust to alternate specifIcations (including the inclusion of state-specific time trends).
Child health was also found to improve due to increased eligibility for children from low
income families, such that the average increase in eligibility of 15.1 percentage points from
1984 to 1992 was associated with a 5.1 percent decrease in child mortality.
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These findings were critiqued in Kaestner (1999) for failing to control for the size of
the poor population in each state. Using individual self-reported data from the National
Maternal and Infant Health Survey, Kaestner fll1ds little effect of Medicaid insurance on
utilization of prenatal care, or on low birth weight. His criticism of Currie and Gruber
(1996a) is perhaps unfounded; to the extent that within-state patterns in the size of the poor
population are time-invariant, the fixed effects framework adopted by Currie and Gruber
(1996a) would control for the size of the poor population. Even if the size of the poor
population within a given state was time-varying, state-specific trends in poor population
size would have to be correlated with Medicaid eligibility thresholds within and across states
to bias estimated effects of the eligibility measure. Finally, if a correlation existed, it would be
unlikely to be apositive correlation: in a time of increasing fiscal constraints, it would be
unlikely that a state would expand eligibility thresholds when demand for services was
increasing. Therefore, to the extent that poor population size and state-imposed Medicaid
eligibility are correlated, any induced bias in Currie and Gruber (1996a) estimates may be
downward.
On balance, there is some evidence that expansions to Medicaid policy improved
infant health, although several studies have suggested that the magnitude and significance of
this effect is circumspect (I(.aestner, Joyce and Racine 1999, Dubay et al. 2001, and Card and
Shoe-Sheppard, 2004). In particular, Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004) use a very similar
identification strategy as Currie and Gruber (1996b), applied to data from Survey ofIncome
and Program Participation, the March Current Population Survey, and the Health Interview
Survey. These data allow for a richer specification, including state-specific age trends in
coverage for children, which are found to lower estimates of Medicaid coverage take-up
rates reported in Currie and Gruber by roughly one-half. The most recent supportive
evidence is given in Conway and Deb (2005), who show that controlling for the normality
versus complexity of pregnancy is important in identifying both significance and the
magnitude of the effects of prenatal care on infant outcomes.
1.2. Length of Stay
The literature on length of stay initially used duration of hospital stay as a measure
for hospital efflciency. Changes in the late 1990s associated with the Balanced Budget Act
12
(BBA) of 1997 and Balanced Budget Refmement Act (BBRA) of 1999 lead to a switch in
Medicare reimbursement policy: instead of determining reimbursement based upon the
average hospital cost of care received, reimbursement rates were prospectively determined
based upon specific care received (geographic differences in cost of care were allowed for by
region-specific adjustment factors). Youms and Forgione (2008) show that this resulted in
shorter length of stay for Medicare patients. Other studies have documented a similar
reduction in hospital length of stay for newborn deliveries: between 1980 and 1992,
postpartum length of stay for vaginal deliveries declined from 3.9 to 2.1 days on average,
while postpartum length of stay for cesarean deliveries decreased from 7.8 days to about 4
days on average (Thilo et aI., 1998, and Hyman, 1999).
These reductions in length of stay resulted in questions about the trade-off between
efficiency and quality of care. The popular press noted a number of cases where early
discharges resulted in preventable subsequent complications and hospitalization (Declercq,
1999, and Eaton, 2001). Between 1995 and 1998,42 states responded by enacting minimum
postpartum length of stay laws. The Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act was
adopted in 1996, mandating federal minimum stay requirements, with enforcement
commencing in 1998 (Evans et aI., 2008).
These requirements were shown to decrease early discharge rates for newborns, and
although no impact was found on re-admission rates for privately insured and vaginally-
delivered newborns, a significant reduction in re-admission rates for newborns with cesarean
delivery was documented (Evans et aI., 2008). However, this time period overlaps
substantial increases in Medicaid eligibility income thresholds. Whether these eligibility
expansions served as a separate channel for an increase in length of stay is an important
question. Indeed, Dafny and Gruber (2005) fmd negative effects on average length of stay
associated with increased eligibility expansions to children, which was mediated by an
increase in the number of procedures performed. But, existing studies have not addressed
whether similar effects are observed for pregnancy-related admissions of adult women. If
increases in Medicaid eligibility resulted in primarily inducing coverage and care for the
uninsured, it is plausible that expected reimbursement rates for hospitals increased as a result
of the eligibility expansions, which may lead to an incentive for hospitals to retain patients
longer. On the other hand, if expansions resulted in primarily inducing low-income privately
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insured individuals, these expansions may have led to a reduction in the reimbursement rate
for hospital, which may lead to an incentive to shorten the length of stay for the marginal
patient induced onto Medicaid as a result of the state eligibility expansions.
1.3. Maternal Health
While longer length of stay may ameliorate risks associated with early discharge,
Medicaid expansions may also affect other maternal outcomes. Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin
(1999) look at how differential incentives provided by reimbursement rates under Medicaid
over time affect likelihood of elective cesarean deliveries. Haas et al. (1993) develop a fairly
narrow set of measures of maternal health to assess the impact of Medicaid expansions in
Massachusetts on maternal health. Their measures include severe pregnancy-related
hypertension, placental abruption, and whether or not the mother's hospital stay exceeds the
infant's by at least one day, as well as whether cesarean methods were used in delivery.
Using a standard difference-in-difference approach, they fInd no statistically signifIcant
change in the inter-payer difference in adverse outcomes relative to women with private
insurance for either uninsured or Medicaid patients. They do fInd a reduction in the gap of
cesarean deliveries for both uninsured and Medicaid mothers relative to private-payer
patients.
A more recent study by Conway and Kutinova (2006) expands the set of maternal
measures to include weight of the mother before and after contraception and delivery, as
well as a measure for excessive hospitalization similar to Haas et al. (1993). They employ
both two-stage least squares and bivariate probit techniques to model endogeneity and
selection of prenatal care and health status, as well as stratify results by parity (whether or
not the pregnancy is the woman's fIrst pregnancy), race, and high school completion. They
fInd that receiving timely and adequate prenatal care may be effective in maintaining a
healthy weight after birth, and for African Americans, a slight reduction in the probability of
excessive length of hospitalization associated with delivery.
Given the observed low take up rates, crowd out, and generally delayed use of
prenatal care by new Medicaid enrollees2, maternal health mayor may not be affected by
Medicaid policy expansions. While there is some evidence that the type of hospital care
2 See Gruber (2000) for an exposition on crowd-out, take-up and prenatal care use literatures.
--------
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received can be affected both by insured status and relative reimbursement rates, differential
health outcomes may be expected, but primarily for complications which can be avoided
through prenatal care sought at any stage of pregnancy, up to even the last month of
gestation. It is well documented that infectious diseases lead to a number of complications
during child-birth - both for the mother and child (American Pregnancy Association, 2003).
Given that diagnosis procedures and treatment for these diseases are readily available and
relatively inexpensive to administer, increased access to prenatal care at any stage of
gestation will likely result in improved health outcomes for both mother and child.3
2. Data and Methodology
For the analysis, I use data from the Health Care Utilization Project (HCUP) which
includes the universe of all discharges from a representative sample of hospitals in 12 states
between 1989 and 2001.4 These data provide limited demographic information of each
patient, admission-specific information (e.g. diagnosis codes, length of stay, and number of
procedures), total hospital charges, and hospital-specific information (e.g. hospital size,
teaching status, rural or urban location, and ownership control status).5 State Medicaid
income thresholds for eligibility of pregnant women are drawn from the National
Governor's Association's "State Coverage of Pregnant Women and Children," Updates for
1990 through 2001.6
3 I was not able to establish an effect of the policy expansions on low birth-weight.
4 Data are available for 16 states. I include data from Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Race/ethnicity
information is not reported by Georgia, Illinois, Oregon and Washington. Given that race/ethnicity is an
important covariate, I opted to retain only states which provide this information. See Appendi..'l: A for table
showing the number of admissions by state by year.
5 Preliminary descriptive statistics showed measurement error in HCUP hospital ownership data. For example,
after 1998, many of the hospitals in several of the states omitted ownership from these data altogether, while in
other years and other states, reported ownership was verified to be incorrect. Therefore, ownership was
collected from a variety of sources. For 1988 through 1999, the National Bureau of Economic Research's
(NBER) Prospective Payer System ownership control data were mapped to hospitals within the HCUP
database, and supplemented with the American Hospital Association's Guide to the Health Care Field for
1992, 1998, and 2001. NBER data were derived from the Center for Medicaid and Medicare (CMS) database
for hospital reimbursement through Medicare. For 2000 and 2001, hospital ownership control data were
directly retrieved from the CMS system.
6 January 1990 values are used for the 1989 year.
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The central question of this study is whether increased provision of publicly-
provided health coverage results in improved outcomes. However, identification of an
effect of Medicaid coverage on either 1) longer/shorter length of stay, or 2) improved health
outcomes for the mother requires isolating an effect of increased Medicaid coverage that is
exogenous to other (potentially unobservable) characteristics or conditions which may affect
length of stay and/or infection incidence. Medicaid recipients are generally poorer. As low
economic status is strongly correlated with education and other observable and unobservable
characteristics, persons qualifying for Medicaid are presumably, on average, less likely to be
knowledgeable about disease risks and more likely to lack access to services or lifestyle
amenities which are correlated with health (nutrition, housing conditions, hygiene, etc.).
Alternatively, given low reimbursement rates, Medicaid may be perceived as lower quality
coverage leading to sorting by illness status, or hospitals may be inclined to shorten the
length of hospital stay.
Expansions to the income eligibility thresholds across states and over time are
presumably exogenous to unobservable characteristics and conditions which joindy affect
coverage and health outcomes. Since Medicaid expansions differed in timing and magnitude
across states, state fixed effects can be used to control for all non-time-varying state-specific
effects, while time fixed effects can control for time-varying trends common to all regions.
Under the assumption that any state-specific time-varying trends which may be joindy
correlated Medicaid coverage and health outcomes are uncorrelated with the exogenous
state-year specific policy trends in Medicaid eligibility, income thresholds by state and year
are an obvious instrument.7
7 If Medicaid recipients are poorer and therefore more or less likely to present illness, these unobservable
characteristics may be considered by states in setting in Medicaid policy. While it may be that states differ in
their tolerance for public provision of benefits to the poor, the level effect of this variation can be controlled
for with state fixed effects. If legislative generosity becomes more or less generous over time depending upon
perceived need, inclusion of additional covariates is needed; this is the justification for inclusion of the percent
poor and unemployment rate discussed below. Alternative identification strategies offered in the literature
have imposed a difference-in-differences estimator across otherwise similar states, but for changes to the
Medicaid policy. As discussed above, these studies are limited by the potential for an unidentified trend shared
across the states which is jointly correlated with coverage and health. The identification strategy used in this
study benefits from identification off of variation across a large number of states over time, reducing the
likelihood of spurious effects. It could be argued that relatively generous states for eligibility are relatively more
or less generous with reimbursement, and reimbursement is correlated with outcomes. Again, the trend in
reimbursement would have to correlate across states and over time. Gruber (2000) indicates a substantial
degree of variation in Medicaid reimbursement rates across states, but no suggestion that reimbursement would
be correlated with eligibility. A simple correlation of physician reimbursement at delivery with Medicaid
generosity shows a very weak correlation for 1998 (-0.17). Additional work needs to be done to determine to
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Following Currie and Gruber (1996a,b), a simulated instrument is used to capture
"legislative generosity," rather than the income eligibility threshold itself. The instrument is
designed to capture variation in the legislative generosity of Medicaid eligibility thresholds in
each state and year. Specifically, I compute for each state the proportion of all child-bearing
women in the Current Population Survey for a given year that would be eligible for Medicaid
under the state's income threshold for that year. This instrument allows for variation in the
generosity of state Medicaid eligibility standards, while avoiding the variation in actual
Medicaid eligibility that is driven by state demographics and local business cycles.8
If legislative generosity is correlated with incomes and economic cycles, this may not
alone be a valid instrument. Thus, I follow the suggestion in Kaestner (1999) by including
controls for the proportion of the population at or below the federal poverty standard and
the unemployment rate for each state in a given year, to control for underlying trends in each
state's economy which may be correlated with both coverage and health, as well as legislative
generosity. Hospital fixed effects control for any time-invariant neighborhood
characteristics, such as race/ethnicity, socio-economic status, education, housing value, and
household size.9 Year fixed effects control for national trends, such as macroeconomic
business cycles.
I employ a two-stage approach to evaluate first the impact of Medicaid eligibility
expansions on Medicaid coverage, and second, given increased Medicaid coverage as a result
of eligibility expansions, improved health outcomes. The first stage specification is as
follows for individual hospitalizations i, in hospital), state k, and year t.
C =a + PZkt + bXij + 1JYkt + 6Hjk + ¢ft + f.1i,
where Cikl is one of three binary variables for whether an individual hospitalization, in a
given state and year, was paid for under Medicaid, private insurance, or was classified as
what extent reimbursement may affect length of stay, particularly controlling for changes in state minimum
length of stay requirements over the time period.
8 This measure has some important limitations. In particular, the CPS does not provide asset information, and
therefore state asset requirements cannot be included in eligibility calculations. NGA reports indicate that
while a number of states had removed asset requirements by 1989, California, Colorado, Illinois, and Iowa had
not.
9 See Rosenzweig, et al. (1982) for a comprehensive list of factors effecting fetal health.
(1)
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uninsured. The key independent variable measuring Medicaid legislative generosity is Zki'
which varies across states and over time. To control for hospital and individual
characteristics, Xij includes a series of individual and hospital-specific covariates, including
race and age of the patient, size of hospital, whether the hospital is designated as urban or
rural, ownership control status of the hospital, and teaching status of the hospital. Ykt
captures state-year specific controls, including the percent of state k's population at or below
the federal poverty standard in year t, and the percent of the state k's population
unemployed in year t. Hospital and year fIxed effects are included as H.ik and ~.10 I control
for state fIxed effects via inclusion of hospital fIxed effects, since hospitals reside in a fIxed
location.
The second stage specifIcation for maternal health outcomes and length of stay are
modeled as follows:
Oi = '1+ ~i + l3Xij + TYke + VHk + mTe +0, (2)
where 0i is 1) an indicator variable for whether hospitalization was accompanied by an
infectious disease related diagnosis code for the mother, or 2) a zero-truncated variable
indicating the length of stay of hospitalization i in days. Ci is the fIrst-stage predicted
likelihood of being on Medicaid as a result of exogenous changes in Medicaid generosity.
Covariates, as well as hospital and year fIxed effects are specifIed similarly to fIrst stage
coverage regressions. Finally, for length of stay, a series of disease ICD9 classifIcation code
fIxed effects are included, to control for differential length of stay by illness type.
To remove the effect of outliers, I limited the data to observations from hospitals
with 1000 or more pregnancy-related admissions over the entire 13 year sample period. This
reduced the sample from approximately 5.5 to 5.3 million pregnancy-related hospitalizations
in the data set. Due to computational limitations, I drew a random sample of 3 million
observations. Further, to ensure inclusion of only pregnancy-related admissions, all
observations with pregnancy diagnoses, but classifIed as male hospitalizations were omitted,
as well as outlier length of stay records reporting greater than a month hospital stay.
10 To examine differential effects of Medicaid generosity on Medicaid coverage, I interact hospital-specific
variables for size, ownership, teaching status and location with the generosity variable Zkt to differentiate
generosity effects by type of hospital.
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3. Descriptive Statistics
3.1. Coverage
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the primary variables considered. On
average, 36 percent of pregnancy-related hospitalizations over the sample period were
covered under Medicaid. The average length of hospital stay was 2.4 days, with a
considerable degree of variation. Infections were present in 2.6 percent of cases. Of
hospitals which report race and ethnicity information, 15 percent of hospitalizations were
African American, and 20 percent were of Hispanic origin. l1 Roughly 18 percent of the total
population was below the poverty line, while the average unemployment rate was 6 percent.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Std.
Obs Mean Dev. Min Max
Medicaid-payer 2,993,458 0.359 0.480 0 1
Private-Insured 2,993,458 0.562 0.496 0 1
Uninsured 2,993,458 0.059 0.236 0 1
Length of Stay 2,993,458 2.391 1.810 0 31
Infection 2,993,458 0.026 0.158 0 1
Coverage 2,993,458 0.349 0.068 0.158 0.542
For-profit Hospital 2,993,458 0.111 0.314 0 1
Non-profit Hospital 2,993,458 0.752 0.432 0 1
Government Hospital 2,993,458 0.137 0.344 0 1
Black 2,993,458 0.147 0.354 0 1
Hispanic 2,993,458 0.198 0.398 0 1
Percent in Poverty 2,993,458 0.182 0.049 0.082 0.269
Unemployed 2,993,458 0.060 0.018 0.021 0.106
Source: HCUP and CPS. Universe rfallpregnanty related admissions in 16 states over 13years.
Dummy variables arepresented without standard deviation.
Unlike other studies, where it is possible to observe those who choose not to utilize
health care services in addition to those that do, this study observes the choice of medical
coverage conditional on use; that is, I observe hospital admissions and payer types. The fIrst
stage model for coverage therefore, is conflned to a compositional analysis of payer type
across hospital type, given changes to Medicaid policy.
11 These figures indicate some sample selection of the hospitals which report race; higher than average
proportions of Hispanics and African Americans indicate hospitals residing in diverse neighborhoods are more
likely to report race/ethnicity, when these reporting requirements are not mandatory.
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I present descriptive statistics for coverage and length of stay variables over time in
Figures 2 and 3. Overall, Medicaid payer pregnancy-related hospitalizations increase from 29
percent in 1989 to nearly 40 percent of pregnancy-related hospitalizations in 1993. There is
a slight decline, accompanied by an increase in private insurance hospitalizations through the
mid-1990s, which is most likely associated with macroeconomic cycles. Throughout the
period, there is a steady decline in the number of uninsured hospitalizations.
Length of stay by payer type exhibits a more erratic pattern. In general there is a
decline in the length of stay for all three groups through 1995, followed by an increase for
both private-payer and Medicaid patients. However, Medicaid and private-payer length of
stay remain between 2 and 2.5 days by the end of the period, while length of stay for the
uninsured was slighdy lower on average for the uninsured. Note that some of these changes
in length of stay may reflect compositional changes in addition to behavioral changes.12
Figure 2: Trends in Medicaid, Private Insurance, and Uninsured Hospitalizations
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Source: H CUP database.
12 It should be noted that these patterns in length of stay are roughly in line with the timing of state and
national minimum stay requirements. The more erratic pattern for the uninsured probably reflects the
attachment of many of these mandates to inJuranceproviderJ rather than the hospitals themselves.
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Figure 3: Trends in Length of Stay for Pregnancy-Related Hospitalizations
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Source: HCUP database.
Expansions in Medicaid eligibility income thresholds and coverage rates for pregnant
women are presented in Table 2. Income thresholds adopted at the state level on average
increase substantially in the first four years from 133 percent in 1989 to 164 percent of the
federal poverty standard in 1992. The increase in the eligibility cut-off increases less rapidly
there after, and by 2001 was nearly 200 percent of the poverty standard. Generosity of state
Medicaid coverage increased from 24 percent in 1989 to just under a third of population of
the child-bearing female population (15-44 years of age) in 1992, and gradually increased to a
peak of 40 percent in 1998.
While Medicaid eligibility became increasingly generous over time, average utilization
of Medicaid for pregnancy related hospitalization leveled off to 37 percent of
hospitalizations after 1992. Therefore, although many more women were eligible to receive
Medicaid hospital care following 1992, expansions to coverage beyond a certain proportion
of the population ceased to induce greater Medicaid coverage. This suggests, ceterisparibus,
that take up rates for women affected by later expansions may be close to zero, which is
consistent with the broad literature suggesting publicly provided Medicaid coverage is
relatively less attractive than privately administered coverage for those sufficiently able to pay
for private insurance.
21
Table 2: National Trends in Medicaid Income Thresholds and Eligibility
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Income Threshold (% FPL) Simulated Income Eligibility
133% 24%
155% 29%
160% 31%
164% 33%
170% 35%
170% 36%
172% 35%
172% 36%
173% 38%
189% 40%
189% 39%
193% 38%
197% 37%
Source: NGA State Coverage ofPregnant Women and Children,"MCR Update, selectedyears.
Income threJhold represents average ofyearjy income thresholds usedfor eligibiliry mross all states included in the
R CUP database.
Inmme eligibiliry rates areyearjy averagesfor the proportion ofa nationaljy represetltative sample (CPS) ofchild-
bearing-aged women who were income-eligiblefor Medicaid under state specific rules.
3.2. Hospital Composition
Table 3 shows that the Medicaid expansions had differential impacts on the patient
mix at different hospital types. In general, Medicaid recipients are an increasing proportion
of all admissions. However, while the proportion of pregnancy-related hospitalizations
covered under Medicaid increased at non-profit, for-profit, urban and rural, non-teaching,
and large-to-medium hospitals, a decrease was observed for government, teaching, and small
hospitals. Notably, the most significant increases are seen between 1989 and 1992, which is
consistent with earlier expansions to Medicaid eligibility affecting relatively poorer
individuals than later expansions. The largest increases were seen at for-profit, rural, and
non-teaching hospitals. For profit hospitals proportion of Medicaid payers increased from
28 percent to 38 percent between 1989 and 1992, rising to 44 percent by 2001. Similarly at
rural hospitals, Medicaid-payer admissions rose from 30 percent of all admissions in 1989 to
42 percent in 1992 and 45 percent by 2001. At government hospitals, the share of Medicaid
admissions decreased from 58 percent in 1989 to 52 percent in 2001. Similar trends were
observed at non-teaching and small hospitals.
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Table 3: Composition of Medicaid Payers by Hospital Type
30% 42% 43%
31% 37% 37%
44% 41% 40%
23% 36% 36%
28% 35% 35%
31% 36% 36%
51% 56% 47%
Sourre: H CUP database, selectedyears.
3.3. Health Outcomes
The measure for maternal health is given by the incidence of infectious-disease
diagnoses associated with pregnancy-related admissions. To my knowledge, it is the first
time that this measure of preventable complications has been used in studies of Medicaid.
As mentioned earlier, infectious diseases are easily diagnosed and treated with adequate
access to prenatal care. However, if left untreated, bacterial infections commonly escalate to
complications during child birth, such as pelvic inflammatory disease and ectopic
pregnancies, which can cause death for the mother and child. These complications not only
increase risks to mother and child; they are quite costly as well. Average hospitalization costs
of normal deliveries across all states was $3,590, while hospitalizations with infectious
complications was $7,823 (2001$). The time trend over the sample period of infectious
disease-related diagnoses and related complications is presented in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Incidence ofInfection in Pregnancy-Related Hospitalizations
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Souree: H CUP database, selectedyears.
There is a markedly higher incidence in infectious disease rates between 1989 and the
peak incidence in 1998 (1.8 percent of admissions versus 3.6 percent). Incidence was even
more remarkable for Medicaid and uninsured hospitalizations, reaching a peak in 1998 of
just over 4 percent.13 This increase in the incidence of infectious disease-related
hospitalizations among pregnancy-related admissions was primarily attributed to an increase
in non-specific (not otherwise specified, or not elsewhere classified) infectious diseases, and
the incidence of Pelvic Inflammatory Disease. Incidence of both gonorrhea and syphilis are
generally constant or declining over the sample period.
However, the trend in infection rates varied across states. In states with increasingly
generous eligibility requirements, the growth rate of infection and low birth was lower than
in states with relatively less generous eligibility expansions. Table 4 presents a comparison of
incidence of infectious disease-related admissions to Medicaid generosity between relatively
generous states (California, Iowa, and Massachusetts) and relatively less generous states
13 The reason for the decline and generally lower rates for infection among the uninsured is not clear.
Expansions to Medicaid made it virtually impossible for low income mothers not to receive Medicaid coverage,
such that if an uninsured and low income mother showed up to the hospital she would be enrolled in Medicaid
automatically. Therefore, the lower observed rates for the uninsured could accurately reflect selection by
relatively health persons into uninsured status, or the inclusion of "self-insured" in the uninsured classification
in HCUP.
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(Arizona and Colorado). These descriptive statistics suggest that in relatively generous
states, the impact of an outbreak in infection was mitigated through policy intervention, a
hypothesis I will investigate in the next section.
Table 4: Infection Incidence and Medicaid Generosity Over Time
Infection Incidence Coverage Rates
Low Generosity High Generosity Low Generosity High Generosity
AZ, CO CA, lA, :MA AZ, CO CA, IA, :MA
1989 NA 1.44% 12% 31%
1990 NA 1.40% 22% 31%
1991 NA 1.53% 23% 33%
1992 NA 1.52% 24% 33%
1993 1.52% 2.02% 24% 34%
1994 2.91% 2.11% 25% 35%
1995 2.57% 2.53% 25% 37%
1996 2.54% 2.32% 26% 37%
1997 4.58% 2.40% 25% 37%
1998 2.19% 2.09% 24% 50%
1999 2.68% 1.63% 23% 48%
2000 3.21% 1.89% 23% 48%
2001 2.43% 1.80% 22% 48%
Source: HCUP Database andMCH Updates
AZ did start reporting to HCUP until 1995; CO did not start reporting race/ ethnici!J until 1993. Sinre I
indude controlsfOr rare and ethnici!J in all regressions, infection incidem;efOr these states is omitted here from
1989 through 1992.
4. Results
4.1. Insurance Coverage and Length of Stay
As mentioned in the literature review, toward the end of the sample period (1998
onward) federal minimum length of stay requirements were imposed on all states, and during
much of the middle of the sample period, there were state-by-state expansions in minimum
length of stay laws. To the extent that these expansions across states and over time were
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correlated with the state-by-year legislative generosity, estimation of an effect of generosity
on length of stay could be biased. I present results here for length of stay with the heavy-
handed caveat that causal inference is not warranted.14
With that said, results from ftrst-stage coverage regressions are presented in Table 5.
Column 1 shows OLS results for the estimated effect of Medicaid expansions on the
probability of Medicaid coverage for hospital services is positive and signiftcant at the 5
percent level. The point estimate suggests that a 100 percentage point increase in the
proportion of the population eligible for Medicaid results in a 7.8 percentage point increase
in the share of hospital services paid for by Medicaid. This effect is relatively small; given an
average increase in eligibility of 15 percentage points, coverage rates on average increased by
1.2 percentage points as a result of more generous policy. These expansions are
accompanied by decreases in private-payer and uninsured coverage (Column 2 and 3).15
While the estimates are statistically insigniftcant for private-payer and uninsured coverage,
the negative point estimates suggest that, on average, some of the increased coverage stems
from a decrease in the uninsured, while some is due to crowd-out.
Columns 4-7 show differential impacts of eligibility expansions across hospital type.
In general, the largest effects were at small, non-proftt and for-proftt, and urban hospitals. A
100 percentage point increase in the proportion of the population eligible for Medicaid
results in a 29 percentage point increase in Medicaid share at small hospitals, an 8 to 16
percentage point increase at non-proftt and for proftt hospitals, and a 9 percentage point
14 Future work is necessary to isolate an effect of generosity, holding constant these changes in length of stay
standards, before length of stay results are purported to be causal. Here I merely highlight the statistical
relationship present in the data available. Results should be taken as suggestive of a relationship, but not
indicating that policy aims to extend Medicaid eligibility induced longer length of stay for pregnancy
admissions. There is certainly a financial incentive which may lead to longer length of stays; however, the
Medical field, in principle, should not retain patients for longer or shorter periods purely based upon financial
incentives.
15 Although the standard errors are quite large, the point estimate for crowd-out (a reduction in private-payer
coverage resulting from Medicaid expansions) is negative and similar in magnitude to the results reported by
Gruber and Simon (2007). The crowd out literature has stressed the importance of acknowledging the family
effects of crowd out; however, the nature of the HCUP abstract data does not allow for more precise modeling
of individual choice. Also, these estimates show the effect of coverage contingent upon use of hospital
services. Therefore, differential impacts of crowd out might be predicted if privately insured individuals have
different utilization patterns for hospital vs. preventative/clinic care. The precise magnitudes, however, are
uncertain.
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increase at urban hospitals. Given an average increase in eligibility of 15 percentage points
over the sample period, expansions to Medicaid eligibility resulted in an increase in Medicaid
coverage share of 4.4, 1.2,2.4, and 1.4 percentage points at small, non-profit, for-profit, and
urban hospitals, respectively. African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to be
covered by Medicaid for hospital services, and Medicaid coverage is greater on average in
states, and in times, when a greater proportion of the population has incomes below the
federal poverty line. Finally, age has a negative effect on the likelihood of Medicaid
coverage.
Table 6 presents results from the length of stay specifications. Both reduced form
and instrumental variables models show that expansions to Medicaid eligibility resulted in a
longer length of stay for new enrollees on Medicaid. Column 2, for the reduced form model,
shows that a 100 percentage point increase in the proportion of the population eligible for
coverage results in an increase of about 0.9 days. Instrumental variable models (column 4-5)
suggest that the that the length of stay for the marginal person induced onto Medicaid
coverage as a result of the increase in legislative generosity was 12 days longer. Certainly, the
magnitude of the coefficient is unlikely.16 However, the sign does suggest that length of stay
for the marginal person induced onto Medicaid coverage was longer than it would have been
without increased legislative generosity. In terms of the reduced form effect, the observed
increase in generosity resulted in nearly a 5.5 percent increase in the length of admission stay
relative to the average stay of 2.4 days. The reduced form effect across ownership type
suggests larger effects at government hospitals than at either non-profit or for-profit
hospitals.
16 Large changes in magnitude between reduced form and instrumental variables specifications are commonly
associated with nonlinear relationships in the data. Although accommodating nonlinear effects within a linear
two stage least squares model is possible, doing so imposes strong assumptions on the functional form of the
estimator. Alternative approaches could be explored into non-linear least squares estimation, but were deemed
beyond the scope of this study. Future work should investigate the extent to which non-linear effects in
legislative generosity on length of stay contributes to the magnitude of the coefficient.
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Table 5: Medicaid Expansions and Insurance Coverage by Hospital Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid Unins Private Medicaid Medicaid Medicaid
Medicaid Generosity .07803 -.03903 -.0438
(2.51)** (1.46) (0.89)
(7)
Medicaid
* Large Hospital .01641
(0.46)
* Medium Hospital .1211
(2.58)**
* Small Hospital .2887
(3.85)***
* Non-profit .07757
(2.15)*
* For-profit .1547
(3.75)***
* Government .01068
(0.30)
* Teaching .08081
(1.69)
* Non-teaching .07625
(1.71)
* Urban Hospital .08808
(3.19)***
* Rural Hospital -.1106
(0.96)
Black
(1 =African American) .1766 -.006016 -.1735 .1767 .1766 .1766 .1766
(16.11)*** (0.79) (13.47)*** (16.11)*** (16.11)*** (16.09)*** (16.12)***
Hispanic
(1 =Hispanic origin) .1617 .02639 -.1799 .1618 .1617 .1617 .1616
(9.94)*** (1.53) (10.58)*** (9.93)*** (9.94)*** (9.94)*** (9.94)***
Age in years at
admission -.06667 -.001977 .0675 -.06668 -.06667 -.06667 -.06667
(11.48)*** (2.07)* (10.97)*** (11.49)*** (11.48)*** (11.48)*** (11.47)***
Age squared .0008765 .0000311 -.0008853 .0008766 .0008764 .0008765 .0008764
(10.78)*** (2.46)** (10.18)*** (10.79)*** (10.78)*** (10.78)*** (10.77)***
Percent below
poverty line .3898 -.3006 -.06833 .3795 .3866 .3899 .3807
(2.45)** ('1.87)* (0.65) (2.35)** (2.46)** (2.46)** (2.49)**
Unemployment Rate -.1493 -.0992 .2351 -.1567 -.1478 -.149 -.1538
(0.63) (0.52) (0.78) (0.65) (0.62) (0.63) (0.65)
Constant 1.295 .189 -.5141 1.28 1.295 1.295 1.293
(10.66)*** (6.34)*** (4.25)*** (10.20)*** (10.75)*** (10.42)*** (10.61)***
299345
Observations 2993458 8 2993458 2993458 2993458 2993458 2993458
R-squared 0.33 0.11 0.37 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Robust t statistics in parentheses (clustered at the hospital state level)
All models regress indicator variables for whether the hospitalization was paid for by Medicaid, private insurance, or was
uninsured, on Medicaid Generosity and covariates. Medicaid Generosity reflects the proportion of the U.S. population in a
given year which would be eligible for Medicaid in a specific state in a given year under each state's income eligibility
threshold.
All models include fixed effects for each hospital, controls for hospital type (to control for changing mix of hospitals and
hospital reclassification), and year fixed effects.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 6: Length of Stay by Hospital Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IV
RF Interaction
OLS RF Interactions IV
Medicaid
(1 = Medicaid-payer hospitalization) .03226 11.84
(2.37)** (8.74)***
* Non-Profit 9.364
(8.85)***
* For-Profit 10.48
(8.94)***
* Government 17.4
(6.25)***
Medicaid Generosity .8821
(2.67)**
* Non-Profit Hospital .6947
(1.91)*
* For-Profit Hospital 1.103
(5.05)***
* Government Hospital 1.367
(5.06)***
Black (l=African American) .1566 .1621 .162 -1.876 -1.61
(11.11)*** (10.36)*** (10.36)*** (8.04)*** (8.18)***
Hispanic (1 = Hispanic origin) -.011 -.006504 -.006297 -1.889 -1.61
(0.74) (0.42) (0.41) (8.76)*** (9.07)***
Age in years at admission -.02821 -.03047 -.03048 .7665 .6749
(10.09)*** (9.46)*** (9.47)*** (8.40)*** (8.60)***
Age squared .0006541 .0006843 .0006844 -.009792 -.008616
(14.73)*** (13.44)*** (13.47)*** (8.16)*** (8.31)***
Percent below poverty line .6567 .8506 .7649 -3.908 -3.599
(0.91) (1.02) (0.93) (6.76)*** (6.78)***
State Unemployment Rate -.7172 -.7818 -.707 1.678 1.511
(0.53) (0.47) (0.43) (3.12)*** (2.99)***
Weekend
(1=Weekend admission) -.07587 -.07448 -.07447 -.1219 -.1147
(27.47)*** (22.28)*** (22.30)*** (13.57)*** (14.16)***
Constant 2.227 2.041 1.963 -12.08 -12.23
(15.93)*** (9.79)*** (11.08)*** (7.21)*** (7.96)***
Observations 2993458 2993458 2993458 2993458 2993458
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21
Robust t statistics in parentheses (clustered at the hospital state level for RF specification, and using White's method for IV
models).
All models regress length of stay on Medicaid Generosity and covariates. Medicaid Generosity reflects the proportion of the
U.S. population in a given year which would be eligible for Medicaid in a specific state in a given year under each state's
income eligibility threshold.
All models include fixed effects for each hospital, controls for hospital type (to control for changing mix of hospitals and
hospital reclassification), and both diagnosis code and year fixed effects.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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4.2. Health Outcomes
Table 7 presents results for models for the incidence of bacterial infection in
pregnancy-related hospitalizations. In both reduced form and instrumental variables models,
Medicaid expansions are found to reduce the probability of infectious disease-related
admissions. The weakly significant reduced form estimate suggests that a 100 percentage
point increase in the proportion of the population eligible for Medicaid results in a 4.1
percentage point reduction in the probability of infection. The strongly significant
instrumental variable point estimate shows that the marginal person covered by Medicaid as
a result of the policy expansion exhibited a 68 percentage point lower rate of infection.
Certainly, the magnitude of the IV coefficient is implausibly large given an average infection
rate of 2.6 percent across all hospitalizations in the sample.17 However, the sign is suggestive
of a significant reduction in the likelihood of disease at admission. Focusing on reduced
form effects, Medicaid eligibility expansions on average contributed to lowering disease
incidence by 0.6 percentage points, which, given the average infection rate of 2.6 percent,
represents a 24 percent reduction in the rate of infection.18
As expected, the OLS model (column 1) indicates that being on Medicaid results in a
significandy higher likelihood of disease incidence. As discussed above, these basic results
are biased, since a host of other variables pertinent to the likelihood of disease incidence are
correlated with the independent variable of interest - being on Medicaid. Instrumental
variables identifies only off of the exogenous variation associated with state-by-state
expansions to Medicaid eligibility. Thus, although in a descriptive sense, persons receiving
care through Medicaid are more likely to present infectious disease complications during
delivery, policy expansions enabling more people better access to care through Medicaid
results in a lower likelihood of disease than otherwise would be the case.
17 Future work will investigate the extent to which non-linear effects in legislative generosity on infection
contributes to the magnitude of the coefficient.
18 These figures are plausible when I consider relative infection rates by insurance source. Those covered on
Medicaid are more likely to present infectious disease at hospitalization: 5 percent of Medicaid pregnancy-
related admissions were present with infection, compared to 3.4 percent for those covered by private insurance
and 4 percent for the uninsured. It is important to note that these estimates assume linear effects of policy
expansions, which are presumably non-linear. Early expansions would predictably result in larger effects, while
later expansions would predictably result in smaller effects.
Observations 2993458 2993458 2993458 2993458 2993458
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02
Robust t statistics in parentheses (clustered at the hospital state level for RF, and using White's method for IV
models).
All models regress an indicator variables for whether the hospitalization accompanied by an infectious disease
diagnosis code on Medicaid Generosity and covariates. Medicaid Generosity reflects the proportion of the
U.S. population in a given year which would be eligible for l\,fedicaid in a specific state in a given year under
each state's eligibility threshold.
All models include fixed effects for each hospital, controls for hospital type (to control for changing mix of
hospitals and hospital reclassification), and year fixed effects.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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S. Robustness
I tested the sensitivity of the results to use of a linear probability model by estimating
reduced form probit models for both first state coverage and reduced form infection
models. These results are presented in Table 8. Although significance for coverage is
reduced, the magnitude and significance for direct effects of legislative generosity on length
of stay and disease incidence are similar, suggesting any bias from use of a linear model is
relatively small.
As with all time-series cross-sectional analyses, correlated time trends can produce
spurious results. I therefore include state-specific time-trend controls. The results from
Table 8 show that the magnitude of reduced form estimates for the effect of Medicaid
generosity are lower for both infectious disease incidence and hospital length of stay when
state-specific time trends are included. Significance for the length of stay regression is
noticeably reduced.
Table 8: Robustness of Coverage, Length of Stay, and Disease Incidence Results
Medicaid Medicaid Generosity
Linearprobabiliry model bias
Coverage (probit)
Infection (probit)
State time-trend bias
Infection (Time trend)
Length of Stay (Time trend)
Construct validiry
Coverage (Men 45-65)
Infection (Men 45-65)
Length of Stay (Men 45-65)
.09693
(1.53)
-.01107
(0.79)
-.02566
(1.79)*
-.02634
(1.87)*
.3302
(1.81)*
-.00064
(0.55)
1.028
(1.70)
All models include same covariates as in initial regressions.
Construct validity tests limit the sample to hospitalizations among men aged 45-65.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Finally, as a construct validity test, I limit the sample of hospitalizations to men aged
45 to 65, and look for effects on coverage, disease incidence, and length of stay of Medicaid
policy targeting pregnant women. Insignificance of these results suggest that Medicaid
coverage specifically designed to increase coverage and medical treatment for pregnant
women do not affect coverage and disease incidence for men. However, length of stay
results show similar levels of significance (and higher magnitude) than for pregnancy-related
admissions, suggesting that trends in length of stay of hospitalization may be less a result of
increased coverage, and more a result in underlying medical trends across states correlated to
the policy variable of Medicaid generosity.
6. Conclusions
Medicaid, as the largest public entitlement program for health care in the United
States, has been heavily studied. Existing literature has focused on the effects of policy
expansion on both the use of health insurance coverage (primarily through prenatal care
use), and health outcomes for children born to mothers under Medicaid. Far less studied are
impacts of Medicaid coverage expansions on maternal health and hospitalization length of
stay resulting from increased legislative generosity. In a descriptive sense, during the 1990s,
infectious disease incidence for pregnancy related admissions was significant. Moreover,
there has been concern over generally declining length of hospital stays associated in part
with adoption of the Prospective Payer System reimbursement policy, and other cost-based
policy designs to increase care efficiency. As noted by Declercq (1999) and Eaton (2001),
shorter hospitalization stays have been associated with incidence of unnecessary
complications and hospital re-admission associated with early discharge, particularly for
newborns (Evans et aI., 2008).
This study has utilized a relatively untapped data resource provided by HCUP, which
offers expansive data on hospitalizations in the United States. These data have enabled this
study to identify a new and relevant effect of Medicaid expansion on increases in Medicaid
coverage. There is some evidence that policy expansions resulted in longer length of
hospital stays, and stronger evidence that increases in legislative generosity resulted in a
decrease in the incidence of infectious disease. However, mandatory minimum length of
stay laws implemented during the sample period at both the state and federal levels warrant a
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fair degree of caution in claiming a causal effect of Medicaid generosity on hospital length of
stay.
Regardless, the maternal health findings alone are important. The probability of
infectious disease-related hospital admissions were roughly 0.6 percentage point lower than
would have been the case in the absence of Medicaid expansions. Given an average cost
savings of $3,873 per avoided infectious disease-related admission, this 0.6 percentage point
reduction resulted in approximately $4.7 million over the sample period. Compared to the
multibillion dollar budget for Medicaid, this number is relatively small. However, the
decrease in disease incidence is only one potential benefit to coverage expansions. Beyond
monetary benefits associated with the policy, increased coverage resulted in important and
potentially life-saving benefits to low income mothers.
As motivation for future work, anecdotal evidence suggests that extension of
Medicaid coverage to low income women may have increased the usage of epidurals during
delivery, since in many states Medicaid covers epidural injections. Since the procedure is
costly, and may be considered elective, expansions to Medicaid may have also offered pain
reduction often desired by mothers during delivery. This, as an additional dependent
variable, may be considered in future renditions of this work.
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CHAPTER III
HETERGENEITY IN WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR HEALTH RISK REDUCTIONS
A large share of the social benefits stemming from environmental regulations in both
the United States and Canada is derived from their effect on human health outcomes.
Alberini (2005) reports that more than eighty percent of monetaty benefits supporting clean
water legislation in the U.S. are derived from associated reductions in human mortality. The
standard measure of mortality risk reduction benefits in the literature has been the Value of a
Statistical Life (VSL). This statistic measures the marginal rate of substitution between
mortality risk and income or wealth. It is common to estimate wage-risk or wealth-risk
tradeoffs Viscusi (1993) by assuming that the individual considers just a single health threat,
for which the risk is reduced by a small amount in the current period (Dreze, 1962; and
Jones-Lee, 1974). For example, based in part upon a series of these wage-related revealed
preference (RP) studies, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency uses a one-size-fits-all
VSL estimate of roughly $6-7 million. Two recent meta-analyses for wage-risk tradeoff
studies have found mean VSL estimates from $3.7 million Mrozek (2002) to $10.8 million
Viscusi (2003), while in Canada the figure has ranged from $6.2 to $9.9 million Chestnut
(2007).
Several shortcomings of wage-risk VSL studies have been highlighted in the
literature. First, they are limited to workplace risks, while environmental and public safety
and health policies often pertain to risks outside the workplace. Second, these studies
implicitly assume full information concerning the relevant risks both within and across
occupations underlying the work choice decision. Finally, it is often difficult to isolate the
risk premium of a particular occupation from other non-pecuniary attributes of a job (time-
flexibility, workplace setting, etc.). As an alternative, stated preference (SP) studies allow for
risks to differ across populations by the use of hypothetical choice scenarios. Survey
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respondents are typically asked to choose among alternative types of risk reductions at
differing costs. Their choices reveal their implied willingness to pay (WTP) for specific risk
reductions which lie within the range of the scenarios posed in the choice questions. The
survey instruments used in SP choice studies are designed to educate respondents about all
of the information pertinent to their decisions, and the survey's choice contexts can be
designed to isolate the effect of a specific risk reduction associated with a given policy
choice. These studies tend to fmd smaller VSL figures Kochi (2006). Yet, while SP studies
ameliorate a number of problems with the revealed-preference wage-risk studies, they rely
on what an individual says he or she would do, rather than actual economic choices. Thus
there are several important protocols which must be observed so that the researcher can
argue for the so-called construct validity of the resulting willingness-to-pay estimates. These
measures are described in detail in Cameron (2006) and will not be reiterated here.
It has been common in both the RP and SP literatures on the valuation of mortality
risk reductions to point out the limitations of a one-size-fits-all measure.19 Suppose a policy
or regulation targets an environmental threat that bears most heavily upon the health of a
particular sub-population (say, the elderly). VSL metrics derived primarily from the
contemporaneous employment decisions of prime-aged white males in blue-collar
occupations are not necessarily appropriate for estimating the willingness to pay of the
elderly to reduce their risk of death in the current period or in future periods. In a recent
Associated Press article entitled "In the numbers game of life, we're cheaper than we used to
be," Seth Borenstein raised questions (and the ire of many readers) about the fact that the
U.S. EPA has used different VSL numbers over time. This flurry of outrage in the U.S. press
again underscores the difficulty of interpretation and potential for misunderstanding with
respect to the benefits of mortality risk reductions within the policy arena.
As an alternative to the standard VSL measure, Cameron (2006) build a utility-
theoretic model for the Value of a Statistical Illness Profile (VSIP). This measure allows for
different valuations of health risk reductions across a variety of health states that make up a
future "illness profile" (including a pre-illness current health state, illness-years, post-illness
recovered/remission years, and lost life-years). By allowing marginal utilities to vary across
19 Baker (2008) consider the conditions on the underlying social welfare function that would be necessary to
justify the application of a single VSL estimate. They also address whether discounts or premia might be
applied to take account of age or vulnerability of the population exposed to the risk. Sunstein (2004) raises the
issue in the legal literature that VSL estimates should vary across individuals.
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the different phases of an entire illness profile, the model integrates health states that have
previously been valued in separate models or separate studies. It recognizes that "sudden
death in the current period" is not the typical illness profile for most environmentally
induced illnesses. Generally, such deaths are preceded by a period of pre-mortality morbidity
that may have a substantial effect on individuals' willingness to pay to reduce their risk of
suffering from such a health threat. Starting from this more-general concept of the VSIP, it
is possible to extract a special case that is close to the more-conventional VSL measure (i.e.
reducing the risk of sudden death in the current period). However, the new construct allows
for illness profiles which involve latency periods and protracted periods of pre-mortality
morbidity (illness-years). It depends fundamentally upon the individual's current age and
income. It is also a natively per-year measure, obviating the need for ad hoc calculation of
the "value of a statistical life-year" (VSLY) based on dividing a conventional VSL by the
average remaining life expectancy in the population.20
Utilizing individual stated-preference data from matching surveys conducted in both
Canada and the United States, I utilize the VSIP framework to investigate differences in
average WTP to pay for health risk reductions across the two different cultures. Only one
recent study has directly compared WTP for health risk reductions between the U.S. and
Canada. (Alberini, 2004) studied a sample of respondents from Hamilton, Ontario, and
compared them to another sample from the U.S. They fmd that Canadians have lower WTP,
at least for those aged forty years and older. Although the study allows for systematic
variation with age, the differences in WTP are not explained through systematic variation
across other sociodemographic characteristics, subjective risks of the diseases in question, or
differences between the Canadian and U.S. health care systems. I extend the cross-national
literature to explain observed differences in individual WTP for health risk reduction
programs by individual heterogeneity in each of these factors. 21
20 Sunstein (2003) addresses the question of whether benefit-cost analysis should employ the value of statistical
lives, or statistical life-years.
21 See Hammitt (2007) for an exposition on the opportunity for inclusion of systematic variation in WIP
studies. Krupnick (2002) identify variation in WIP across age of the individuals, showing weak support for the
notion that WIP for health risk reductions declines with age - evidence of a "life-cycle effect," where
individuals expect to derive increasing marginal utility from reducing health risks that come to bear later in their
lives. DeShazo and Cameron (2005) find statistical evidence that as people age, there is a systematic downward
shift in their anticipated schedule of marginal utility for risk reduction a future ages. These two effects offer
evidence of time inconsistency: at younger ages, individuals seem to value future health more, however, as they
get older, they value future health less.
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This individual heterogeneity is important. First, controls for these individual
characteristics are necessary to prevent cross-national heterogeneity from showing up as
generic cross-national differences (or lack thereof) in health preferences. Second, from a
policy perspective, any WTP number used for benefit-cost analysis should probably reflect
the actual distribution of characteristics in the at-risk population for a particular policy or
regulation. Based on the detailed attitudinal and subjective health perception variables
collected in the survey, I have identified a number of variables for which the distribution
(especially by age) differs between the U.S. and Canada. For example, members of the
Canadian sample appear to express higher subjective probabilities associated with the risk of
heart disease, cancers, respiratory disease, diabetes, and Alzheimer's disease. They are also
more inclined to say they could improve their health by cutting back on smoking and
improving their diet, but are less inclined to believe they can reduce their risk of traffic
accidents through increased use of seat belts. Depending on age, they feel they have more or
less opportunity to improve their health through additional exercise.
Given the universal payer system in Canada and the private-payer system in the
United States, individual perceptions can presumably differ about the efficacy of health care
and its overall accessibility. The survey elicits information about each individual's confidence
in diagnosis and treatment under their respective health care systems. Moreover, the health
risk reduction programs used in the stated choice scenarios for Canadians were stipulated as
being outside the normal course of care under the universal health system, so information
was also collected about their personal experience with instances where they may have gone
outside their provincial health plan for prior medical diagnostic and testing services.
Finally, fitting a WTP model that acknowledges individual heterogeneity and
differing illness profiles allows for computation of WTP that is tailored for specific
populations and health risks. For example, it is of interest to Canadian policy makers to
know if the vast array ofWTP studies based upon U.S. preferences (primarily of prime-aged
blue collar males), can be used to inform environmental and public-health related programs
geared toward Canadians. Can point estimates for mean WTP based upon U.S. preferences
be transfer to the Canadian population? Perhaps it is better to estimate a function for the
underlying preferences, depending on age, gender, education, marital status, etc., and use the
Canadian populations' composition across these demographic characteristics to estimate a
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Canadian specific WTP? But even this application may fail to properly inform Canadian
policy-makers, if the underlying ways in which age, gender, and other demographics affect
preferences over health risks differ between Canadians and individuals from the u.s.
Therefore, to the extent possible, it is beneficial to know how heterogeneity in individual
preferences differs both across individual characteristics and between countries with
different cultures and health systems.
In general, I find evidence that U.S. and Canadian preferences differ, with the
differences largely explained by non-jurisdictional individual heterogeneity. I find substantial
evidence of age profile effects which are generally consistent with other studies. However,
age profiles with respect to WTP to avoid adverse health states are markedly different
between Canadians and U.S. residents. In general, Canadians have a much flatter age profile
for WTP, and this proftle appears to peak at a substantially older age.
Section 1 describes the stated preference survey used in this analysis. Section 2
details a number of differences across countries in the attitudinal and behavioral
characteristics of survey respondents. Section 3 sketches the basic utility theoretic model
used in the empirical estimation, while Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5
discusses the results, focusing on the sudden death scenario in the WTP simulations to
facilitate the most-direct comparisons with the extant literature on VSLs. Section 6
concludes.
1. Survey Design and Data
The data collected for Cameron and DeShazo (2006) provide a unique opportunity
to identify cross-national differences in preferences to avoid adverse health states. The stated
preference dataset was conducted twice-first for Canadian residents using the internet
consumer panel maintained by Ipsos Reid (selected so that the proportions of the sample in
different sociodemographic groups mimic the general population), and a few months later
for the United States using the representative consumer panel maintained by Knowledge
Networks, Inc. Careful administration of the Canadian survey allowed for collection of key
demographic information for Canadians mirroring demographic characteristics included in
Knowledge Network's standing consumer panel for the United States. Information on the
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age, income, educational attainment, marital status, gender, and race/ethnicity are available
for both samples.
In addition to collection of demographic characteristics, the survey collected four
other categories of information from each respondent. First, information was collected
concerning the individual's personal health history and their perceptions of their
susceptibility to specific categories of major health risks. These questions asked about the
respondent's own prior experience with the specific classes of disease that they would
subsequently be asked to consider in the conjoint choice experiments. They were also asked
about the prior experiences of friends and family members with these illnesses, about the
extent to which they believe these disease risks can be controlled through health habits and
life-style choices, and about their personal room to improve their health habits along seven
dimensions, including opportunities to see the doctor more regularly, lose weight, exercise
more, cut down on alcohol consumption, use a seat belt more regularly, improve their diet,
and cut back on smoking.22
The second part of the survey provided a risk tutorial and trained respondents
carefully about how to interpret each of the attributes of the different risk reduction
programs that form the core of the survey. Respondents were required to answer a simple
skill-testing question to evaluate their comprehension of the notion of risk, since risk
comprehension is crucial to the choice tasks.
After about 25 pages of preparation, in the third and main section of the survey, each
respondent is faced with the first of five independent choice scenarios. The first choice
scenario presents all of the quantitative information used in the tutorial section in a
simplified one-page "choice table." See Figure 5 for an example. The individual is asked to
evaluate two health programs offering a reduction in health risk at a monthly cost against the
status quo alternative (i.e. no health risk reduction program, but no expense either). The
respondent was then asked to choose their most preferred option among the three options
available. Each of the two health programs offered randomly assigned reductions in the
probability of getting sick or injured, and described the expected time-to-onset, duration, and
potential for recovery from the illness or injury, as well as the extent to which this health
22 Although the nominal life expectancies used in the illness profiles for the survey's choice experiments were
based upon actuarial life expectancies, respondents were asked at the end of the survey to report their
individual subjective life expectancy based on their health and family history.
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threat would shorten their expected lifespan. Each illness profile was randomly assigned a
disease name, subject to a few exclusions for plausibility (e.g. no recovery from diabetes or
Alzheimer's disease).23
For all disease risks (other than the traffic accidents) each program reduces the risk
of disease incidence via a diagnostic pin-prick blood test administered once per year by the
individual's doctor. The test would indicate whether the individual is at risk of developing
the illness in question. If so, the individual would be prescribed medication and/or lifestyle
changes to reduce the chance of suffering the illness profile in question. 24 Each illness profile
consists of a brief description of the approximate age at which the individual would get sick,
the duration of sickness, symptoms, treatments and prognosis, and anticipated effects on
overall life expectancy. The health programs offered where characterized by both a reduction
in the probability of illness, and associated cost of the program in both annual terms and as
monthly payments.
The fmal section of the survey consisted of debriefIng questions. Some of these were
posed directly after each choice scenario. Another was a general question about the
respondent's confIdence in the ability of health care providers to diagnose and treat illnesses
under their respective health care systems. Debriefmg questions also included assessments of
scenario "buy-in," such as whether or not the individual personally believed they would
benefIt from the risk reduction program, and the age at which the individual subjectively
believed they would benefIt from the program. For the Canadian respondents, information
on the number of times each respondent sought care outside of their universal health plan
was solicited, since the health programs used in the choice scenarios were described as extra-
ordinary care which would not be covered under their provincial health plan.25
23 Other work has found that the disease labels (regardless of the underlying illness profile) do affect individual
preferences to avoid adverse health states. These differences are addressed in Cameron, DeShazo, and Johnson
(2008). However, the randomization of disease labels across illness profiles the respondent is asked to consider
assures that point estimates remain unbiased. Any variation induced by subjective beliefs about specific disease
names would be orthogonal to the illness profiles considered in each scenario.
24 For traffic accident scenarios, the program was described as car equipment such as new airbags, braking
systems, and impact reduction technologies which could be retrofitted to existing vehicles, on included as an
option on new vehicle purchases, with capital costs amortized into monthly payments.
25 Through debriefing questions following each stated choice, respondents who said they would not choose
either offered program had the option to indicate that this was because their provincial health plan should
cover those tests.
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Figure 5: One Randomization of a Conjoint Choice Set
Choose the program that reduces the illness that you most want to avoid. But
think carefully about whether the costs are too high for you. If both programs
are too expensive, then choose Neither Program.
Ifyou choose "neither program", remember that you could die early from a
number of causes, including the ones described below.
Symptoms/
Treatment
Recovery/
Life
expectancy
Risk
Reduction
Costs to you
Your choice
Program A
for Heart Disease
Get Sick when 71 years old
Two weeks of hospitalization
No surgery
Moderate pain for remaining
life
Chronic condition
Die at 79
5%
From 40 in 1,000 to 38 in 1,000
$15 per month
(=$180 per year)
o Reduce my chance
of heart disease
Program B
For Colon Cancer
Get sick when 68 years old
1 month of hospitalization
Major surgery
Severe pain for 18 months
Moderate pain for 2 years
Recover at 71
Die of something else at 73
50%
From 4 in 1,000 to 2 in 1,000
I $4 per month
(=$48 per year)
o Reduce my chance
of colon cancer
o Neither program
The survey was administered to 2,439 respondents from the United States and 1,109
Canadians.26 Certain Canadian and U.S. respondents were excluded for three main reasons.
First, if the respondent did not correctly answer the risk comprehension question, he or she
was excluded from the analysis. Second, if the respondent rejected both programs in a
particular choice scenario solely because they did not believe the program would work, the
respondent's choice under that scenario was dropped from the analysis. Finally,
randomization of illness profiles inadvertently resulted in a small number of implausible
26 The response rate for the US survey was 79% (out of 3000 initially solicited). The Canadian survey was
administered over the internet by Ipsos Reid.
- ---------------
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health profiles (about 1%), and these were dropped to preclude any biases stemming from
how they might have been interpreted.27
Although the Canadian survey was administered to the exclusively computer-literate
Ipsos Reid consumer panel, the sample is reasonably similar to the Canadian population on
several observable dimensions. Table 9 presents a comparison of the Canadian sample to the
U.S. sample and the Canadian population. Particularly with respect to the age distribution,
the Canadian sample closely mirrors the Canadian population as a whole. Although the
sample has fewer elderly (2% compared to 8% in the population), this is expected from a
survey administered over the internet. The income distribution for the sample is skewed
towards lower incomes compared to the population as a whole. The sample has a greater
proportion of females to males, and a slightly greater proportion of the sample is married.
Finally, although there are fewer nonwhites in the sample, the educational attainment (those
earning a college degree of more) is similar between the sample and the Canadian population
as a whole. These differences highlight the importance of allowing for the possibility of
systematic variation in WTP across observable characteristics, so that differences in the types
of people in the sample are not interpreted as differences in preferences for similar types of
individuals.
27 For the US sample, this resulted in dropping 2,191choices from the US sample and 1,040 choices from the
Canadian sample due to risk comprehension failure, 1,791 choices from the US sample and 393 choices from
the Canadian sample due to scenario rejection, and 215 choices from the US sample and 108 choices from the
Canadian sample due to randomization error.
Table 9: Demographic Statistics by Population and Sample - Canada and US
Canada US
Population Sample Population Sample
Age (years)
25-44 45% 44% 47% 39%
45-64 36% 41% 34% 39%
65-74 11% 13% 10% 14%
75+ 8% 2% 9% 7%
Gender
Male 50% 42% 49% 48%
Female 50% 58% 51% 52%
Race
White 87% 96% 77% 80%
Nonwhite 13% 4% 23% 20%
Manital Status
Married 48% 67% 54% 69%
Nonmarried 52% 33% 46% 31%
Education
High school or less 56% 58% 69% 70%
College Degree + 44% 42% 31% 30%
Income (US$tOOO)
10- 3% 14% 10% 6%
10-25 20% 31% 19% 18%
25-45 35% 36% 24% 36%
45-65 21% 12% 21% 11%
65-100 14% 5% 14% 21%
100+ 7% 2% 12% 8%
Soum: Statistics Canada, US Census Bureau, and surory data (cifter exclusions). Intetpolation requiredfor income
brackets (equal weightgiven to $5000 increments). Domesticpartners in Canada counted as married.
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2. Differential Patterns in Health Beliefs and Health Care Systems
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 10 show differences between Canadian and
U.S. respondents in attitudes and beliefs about illness risks, subjective beliefs about behavior,
as well as different levels of confidence in the timeliness and quality of health care in the
event that the individual contracts a major illness or suffers a major injury. Canadian
respondents perceive themselves to be less at risk of acquiring a disease or being in a traffic
accident. Moreover, they believe there is less opportunity for lifestyle improvements through
seeing a doctor more regularly, wearing a seatbelt more often, or reducing their consumption
of alcohol. However, they show more opportunity to moderate their weight, exercise more,
and smoke less. They are generally less confident that their health care system will allow
them to obtain timely and effective diagnosis and treatment, and only about sixteen percent
of the Canadian sub-sample has gone outside their provincial health plan for diagnostic tests.
Table 10: Health Risk and Behavior Beliefs, and Health Care System
Controls
US Sample Canadian Sample
Std. Std.
Obs Mean Dev. Obs Mean Dev. Min Max
Health (se!f-reported illness risk)
average subjective risk 1,801 -0.26 0.88 700 -0.07 0.85 -2 2
Behavior (room to improve on:)
see doctor 1,783 -0.49 1.35 697 -0.64 1.27 -2 2
control weight 1,794 0.11 1.41 699 0.24 1.38 -2 2
exerCise 1,793 0.62 1.16 697 0.69 1.11 -2 2
healthy diet 1,792 0.31 1.16 695 0.32 1.10 -2 2
seatbelt use 1,788 -1.25 1.29 692 -1.64 0.94 -2 2
smoking 1,754 -1.02 1.63 680 -0.70 1.80 -2 2
alcohol consumption 1,771 -1.25 1.18 686 -1.35 1.05 -2 2
System Controls
confidence 1,801 0.16 0.67 700 0.03 0.67 -1 1
out-of-plan (absolute) 700 0.88 1.07 0 5
out-of-plan (binary) 700 0.16 0.37 0 1
Average suijective risk taken as the average ofsuijectivejy reported risks for diseases randomjy selected in allfive choice
scenarios. Statistics after exclusion criteria. Out-of-plan variables reflect either the absolute number oftimes the respondent
sought care outside the Canadian universal health plan, or a binary variable for whether or not thepatient sought care
outside the universalplan.
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However, the differences in health-related attitudes and beliefs between Canadian
and U.S. respondents differ with the age of the individual. Appendix II provides and
assortment of figures illustrating differences across countries, by age, in a variety of different
measures. These graphs depict age-wise means and intervals defined by plus and minus two
standard deviations, where the standard deviations are adjusted to reflect sample size in the
age group in question. To enhance the main trends, these three age-wise statistics are
presented as twenty-year moving averages. In each figure, the triple of solid lines applies to
the U.S. sample and the triple of dashed lines applies to the Canadian sample.
The figures in Appendix I reveal differences in subjectively reported risks of
suffering from heart disease, respiratory disease, and traffic accidents, as well as differences
in subjectively reported room for improvement in personal health behaviors. Perceived risk
for Alzheimer's disease and diabetes is generally higher for younger and lower for older
Canadian respondents compared to individuals from the U.S. Perceived risk of acquiring one
of five cancers (prostate, breast, colon, lung or skin) was lower for Canadian respondents.
For the risk of heart disease, younger and middle-aged Canadians reported higher subjective
risks, while older Canadians (75 years and up) reported lower subjective risks (although this
may reflect self-selection into the possibly healthier older internet-using sample in Canada).
Canadian respondents reported substantially higher risks of acquiring respiratory disease for
nearly all age groups, with the differential inverting only for those 75 and older. A similar
pattern is seen for risk of strokes, while litde difference is seen in perceived risk of traffic
accidents up until the age of retirement, whereupon Canadians generally begin to report
lower risks. Again, this could reflect selection biases in the older internet sample in Canada.
While Canadian respondents report similar ability to improve lifestyle habits with
respect to losing weight and improving their diet, they report generally less opportunity at all
ages to wear a seat belt more regularly, or see a doctor more frequendy. In general,
respondents from both samples reported similar opportunities to cut back on smoking. But
Canadian respondents between the ages 35 and 45 reported substantially greater
opportunities to cut back, compared to respondents from the U.S. Younger Canadian
respondents reported less opportunity to reduce alcohol consumption, with the relationship
reversing at about age sixty, at which point older Canadians report significandy more
opportunity to cut back on alcohol consumption.
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It is worth noting that these age-specific and disease-specific prof:1les reveal some
degree of correlation between subjective beliefs about health risks and associated lifestyle
behaviors. The higher perception of risk for diabetes and heart disease among Canadian
respondents is correlated with a greater propensity to see more opportunity for exercise.
Similarly, the higher reported risk among Canadians for respiratory disease is correlated with
reports of more opportunity to cut back on smoking. I might expect that Canadians with
higher risk perceptions of respiratory disease are more willing to pay for health risk
reductions. Likewise, the higher perceived risk of heart disease and diabetes suggests that
Canadian respondents may be more willing to pay for health risk reductions for these
diseases. On the other hand, Canadians who report more opportunity to cut back on
smoking or exercise may prefer either cutting back or exercising more to paying for health
risk reductions. The risk reduction programs to be offered in the stated choice scenarios may
be perceived as substitutes for these other health enhancement activities, or a
complementary measures.
Finally, there are stark differences in the confidence of diagnosis and treatment of
health problems across the two systems. Canadian respondents are generally less confident
in the timeliness and quality of diagnosis and treatment until about age seventy, beyond
which there is little difference in the perceived efficacy of care. Regarding experience with
going outside of their provincial health plan for medical services, Canadian respondents
have, on average, gone outside of their plan for about one in five of the procedures
mentioned in the survey.28 However, only about 16 percent of the Canadian sample had
gone outside of their health plan for diagnostic testing (analogous to the risk reduction
program used to elicit willingness to pay information in the survey's choice scenarios).
28 In addition to diagnostic tests, these medical services included physical exams, flu shots, major surgery,
cosmetic surgery, immunizations for children or for travel, and "other."
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3. Structural Utility-Theoretic Model
This utility-theoretic choice model is described in detail in Cameron (2006), but I
offer a brief explanation of the model in this paper. Denote the two risk reduction programs
in each choice set as A and B, and the status quo alternative for "neither program" as N.
Each program reduces the risk of facing a specified illness profile, but involves a specified
annual cost. The program cost is assumed to apply only during pre-illness years and
recovered years, so the individual would not pay for the program while sick (or dead) if he or
she were to fall victim to the illness or injury. An illness profile is a sequence of future health
states that includes a mutually exclusive and exhaustive combination of pre-illness years, sick
years, post-illness recovered/remission years and lost-life years, and only single spells of any
given illness. Respondents are assumed to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint,
and thus to choose the alternative that gives them the highest level of utility.
For simplicity, consider just the pair-wise choice between program A and N.29 I
assume that the utility of an individual, i, at time, t, depends upon net income in that period,
Y;t minus the cost of any program, cit, and the health state they experience in that period. In
any given period, the individual will be in one of the four possible health states, which are
captured using four indicator variables: I( preit ) for pre-illness years, l( illit) for illness-years,
I(rcvit ) for post-illness recovered/remission years, and l(ly1it) for lost-life years. Write the
individual's indirect utility function in each time period, t, as:
There is uncertainty about whether the individual will actually fall sick from the
disease, so I model each choice as depending upon expected indirect utility, with the
expectation taken across the sick (S) and healthy (H) outcomes. Participation in program A
vs. N is described as altering the probability of getting sick from n~s to n:s.
Furthermore, each illness profile extends through the remainder of the individual's life
expectancy, so I discount future time periods using a constant discount rate r and discount
factor cSt = (1 + r )-t to get the present discounted value (pDV) of expected indirect utility
29 The three-way choice between two programs and neither program is analogous.
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for individual i. The individual is assumed to choose program A over N if his or her
discounted expected utility is greater under A:
The present discounted number of years making up the remainder of the individual's
nominal life expectancy, ~,is given by pdVC;A =I~~I Of . Discounted time periods spent in
the pre-illness state, the recovered/remission state, and as lost life-years from t =1 to t =~
are given by:
pdve: = Iotl(pre;~), pdvit = Iot1(illi~)'
pdvr/ =Iotl(rcvi~)' and pdV(A =Iotl(ZyZi~)'
Since the different health states exhaust the individual's nominal life expectancy,
pdvei
A+ pdV(A + pdvr/ + pdvZt = pdvc: . Finally, to accommodate the assumption that
each individual expects to pay program costs only during the pre-illness or recovered post-
illness periods, pdVp;A = pdvei
A+ pdvr/ is defmed as the present discounted time over
which payments must be made.
To further simplify notation, let:
ctermi
A
=(1- I1~S) pdVC;A + I1~s pdVp;A
yterm: =[pdvc: _(I1~spdvi: +I1~spdvZnJ, and
pterm;A =I1~s [ a1pdv(A +a2 pdvr/ +a3 pdvZt J.
The complexity of cterm;A and ytermi
A
merely reflect the fact that net income over the
future will depend on whether the individual will be sick or dead, with probabilities
depending upon the chance of getting sick, with and without the testing program.
Then the expected utility-difference that drives the individual's choice between
program A and N can then be defined as follows:
MDV (ES,H [V;]) ={! (Y; - cncterm: - !CY;)ytermn + ptermiA+CiA (5)
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The option price, in the sense of (Graham, 1981), is the common maximum certain
payment that makes an individual indifferent between paying for the program and having the
risk reduction, or not paying for the program and not having the risk reduction. Here, I
solve for the common payment which makes the difference in discounted expected utility
between program A and N equal to zero:
[
IVA A A J2AA _ _ fl"Y; ytermi - ptermi -Ci
Ci - Y; fl A
ctermi
where feY) = fljY; has been selected as the best-fitting simple functional form. 30 The
square root form introduces some curvature with respect to net income, yet preserves the
monotonic form. The expected present value of this common certain payment can then be
calculated for the individual's remaining lifetime and can be written as:
Divide ES,H [PV (CiA) ] by the size of the risk reduction, 1~I1tl to get a construct
we can call the Value of a Statistical Illness Profile (VSII'):
This VSIP is a roughly a generalization of the more-familiar VSL. The VSIP is a marginal
rate of substitution (the ratio of the marginal utility of the sequence of health states to the
marginal utility of income) scaled arbitrarily to correspond, like a VSL, to a risk change of
1.0. Due to the reaction to this metric (as seen with Seth Bornstein's AP article), I might
alternatively normalize upon an equally arbitrary 1/1,000,000 risk reduction, which is
expressed as the value an individual's WTP for a risk reduction that is more in the range of
many policies. This normalization might spare uninitiated readers from the idea that
economists are unilaterally deciding upon the worth of a human being.
The marginal utility of an adverse illness profile is in the numerator of the VSIP, so
an increase in the marginal disutility of any component of an illness/injury profile of health-
30 Suggested by a line-search across Box-Cox transformation parameters.
(6)
(7)
(8)
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states-illness years, recovered/remission years, and lost life-years-will increase the VSIP.
Since the marginal utility of income is in the denominator, an increase in the marginal utility
of income will decrease the VSIP.
To illustrate the implications of the fitted model for willingness to pay for health risk
reductions, it is necessary to choose a particular individual and a particular illness profile. In
this paper, I will focus on the illness profile that is assumed in most wage-risk VSL
studies-sudden death in the current period. However, the VSIP framework allows one to
simulate willingness to pay to reduce the risk of a vast array of different illness profiles: with
or without latency, with different lengths of illness, with or without recovery, and with or
without any decrease in life expectancy.
To build a distribution ofWTP values for a particular type of environmental risk for
a particular population, broader simulations would be used. It would be necessary to specify
the distribution of illness profiles that is likely to result from the health threat, the
magnitudes of the risk reductions, and the types of individuals (ages, genders, incomes) who
would be affected by these risk reductions. WTP estimates could then be simulated for each
of a large number of random draws from the distributions of risks (possible illness profiles)
and affected individuals to produce a distribution of WTP estimates for the policy in
question. In this paper, however, I will simply illustrate the disparities in predicted
willingness to pay for a standardized illness profile, emphasizing the interpersonal and
international differences in WTP for this standard profile.
4. Empirical Analysis
In Table 11, I begin with a simple four-parameter model (Model 1) which allows for
differences between U.S. and Canadian preferences by interacting each baseline variable with
an indicator for the Canadian sub-sample. 31 Rather than simply maintaining the hypothesis
that marginal utilities from each health state are independent of the duration of that state and
the accompanying durations of other health states that characterize each profile in question,
a shifted log functional form allows for diminishing marginal (dis)utilities for increased
lengths of time in each adverse health state (Cameron and DeShazo, 2007). This basic
model, therefore, includes a net income term (net of program cost, if risk reduction program
31 Complete results, with t-statistics are provided in Table 22, AppendL'{ G.
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is selected) along with terms for illness years, L1II~s log (pdV(A +I) , recovered/remission
years, L1II~s log (pdvr/ +1) , and lost life-years L1II~s log (pdvliA+1) .
The results for Model 1 suggest a higher marginal utility of income and considerably
less disutility from lost life years for Canadians. As expected, for individuals from both
countries, the marginal utility of net income (i.e. other consumption) is positive (but
diminishing, given the square root functional form). The marginal utilities associated with
each of the three health states are negative (and diminishing, given the log functional form).32
Model 2 in Table 11 presents the results of a utility specification with ten parameters
which allows for systematic variation by age in the marginal (dis)utility from lost-life years. I
adopt the model specified in Cameron and DeShazo (2006), which is the parsimonious
version including just the statistically significant terms in a fully translog model (including all
squares and pairwise interaction terms for the three log terms). The construct called ptermiA
becomes:
[
a1log (pdviiA +1) +azlog( pdvr/ +1) + a 3 log (pdvl/ +1) -
L1II AS
I +a4{log (pdV(A +I)}z+as {log (pdvi/ +1)log (pdvl/ + I)}
To accommodate age, the a coefficients are allowed to differ systematically with the
respondent's current age wherever this generalization is warranted by the data. This leads to
a model where a3= a 30 +a 31agei +a31age~ , and analogously for a 4 and as .33
32 I initially considered use of a quadratic-in-income model specification in conjunction with the shifted-log
functional form for health states. Parameter estimates from the quadratic-in-income model are consistent with
all expectations: positive and decreasing marginal utilities of income, which are positive over the range of
incomes included in the sample. However, moving to a square root functional form for preferences over
income had two advantages: 1) it improves tractability of the model results (especially when all covariates are
included), and 2) produced superior log-likelihood statistics. I therefore retain this restriction throughout.
(9)
33 Inclusion of the squared lost life-years term allows for the marginal utility of the lost life-years term to
depend on the point of reference for lost life-years. This model also allows the marginal disutility from a
discounted lost life-year to depend upon the number of preceding sick-years. Heterogeneity in preferences over
health risk reductions has documented both an increasing and a decreasing willingness to pay for lost life years
with age. (Alberini, Cropper et aL, 2004; and Cameron and DeShazo, 2006). Initially, willingness to pay seems
to increase with age (perhaps as the prospects for illness or death become more salient). Beyond a certain age,
however, it declines (as experience with the aging process lends recognition that life years at older ages are
somehow diminished in value through reduced mobility, aches and pains, loss of self-sufficiency, loss of loved
ones and family, etc.). And inclusion of an interaction term with the number of years spent sick and the
number of life years lost allows for the plausible effect that, the greater the number of years spent ill, the less
value attached to lost life years. There may be fates worse than death.
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Table 11: Empirical Results (point estimates and statistical significance only)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CDN CDN
U.S. ~ U.S. ~ U.S. CDN~
Net income term (complex formula)
X l(female)
X 1(mod low risk of this illness)
X 1(high risk of this illness)
X 1(not confident in health care)
X 1(confident in health care)
Illness Years: llIT;s log (pdvit + 1)
X l(female)
X 1(low risk of this illness)
X 1(mod low risk of this illness)
X 1(mod high risk of this illness)
X 1(high risk of this illness)
X 1(mod. High opp. exercise)
X l(high opp. exercise)
X 1(very low opp. impr smoking)
X 1(mod low opp. impr smoking)
Recovered Years: m;s log (pdVl/ +1)
X l(female)
Lost Life Years: m;s log (pdv1t +1)
X age
X age2
X l(female)
X 1(college degree or more)
X l(non-married)
X 1(low risk of this illness)
X 1(mod low risk of this illness)
X l(mod high risk of this illness)
X 1(high risk of this illness)
X 1(not confident in health care)
X 1(confident in health care)
X 1(have gone outside CDN
plan)
X 1(very low opp. impr. doct.)
Squared: [llIT;s log (pdvit +1)J2
X age
X age2
Interaction:
~rr:s log (pdvi;A +1) X log (pdvl;A +1)
Scenario Adjustment Controls No No Yes
U.S. Sample Selection Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 32079 32079 31836
Log-Likelihood -16707 -16644 -15617
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
S2
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Inclusion of age heterogeneity and more flexible functional form assumptions
certainly improves the explanatory power of the model. However, many of the apparent
differences between the Canadian and U.S. parameters disappear in Model 2. A number of
important attitudinal differences remain unexplained in this model. Canadian and U.S.
individuals have very different age profiles for exercise and smoking behaviors, as well as in
perceived opportunities to see a doctor (among the other attitudinal variables discussed
previously). These differences in the two samples could obscure genuine differences in
preferences for people who might otherwise seem similar. Since the Canadian and U.S.
samples differ along a number of demographics (such as marital status, education, and
gender), it is reasonable to assume that controlling for these differences matters.
Finally, as addressed in Cameron (2007), the survey was designed carefully to illicit
preferences over the stated health scenarios through tutorials and explicit statements.
However, the potential for respondents to subjectively adjust the choice scenarios to more
closely reflect their own situation was assessed through follow-up questions. A share of the
sample either over- or under-estimates the illness latency, and/or reports a different estimate
of their own life expectancy than was specified in their (age- and gender-indexed) copy of
the survey. If these extra-scenario beliefs factor into the respondent's selection of a most-
preferred alternative, then the effect of these scenario adjustments could yield bias. The final
model therefore includes a number of nuisance variables to control for possible "scenario
adjustment" by respondents.
First, following each choice task, respondents were asked about their personal
expected latency for each of the health threats in question. If the respondent expected never
to benefit from a program, or expected the latency of the illness to be longer or shorter than
what was described in the illness profile, this information can be used to construct shift
variables to accommodate over- or under-estimation of the latency. Second, at the end of the
survey, respondents were questioned directly about their individual subjective life
expectancy. To control for deviations between expected and nominal life expectancy in the
choice scenarios, the deviation was similarly allowed to shift the utility parameters in the
model.
Full-fledged selectivity correction models in multiple-choice conditionallogit models
are challenging, so I do not attempt them here. Moreover, non-response modeling data are
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not available for the Canadian sample. Here, I do have the data needed to estimate a
response/non-response model that produces fitted response probabilities for each individual
in the u.s. sample. For each u.s. respondent, I use the deviation of this fitted response
propensity from the median response propensity among all 500,OOO-plus members of
Knowledge Network, Inc.'s initial random-digit-dialed recruiting sample. For Canadian
respondents, the variable takes on a value of zero, such that no "correction" is made for
deviation between predicted response propensity and average response propensity. While
Canadian response/non-response propensities are left uncorrected, I note that the models
control for all the observables upon which the Canada and us samples differ in terms of the
marginal distributions, and this strategy will minimize the impact of selection bias on the
basic coefficients.34
Model 3 in Table 11 presents a parsimonious specification of the expanded ten
parameter model when additional covariates are interacted with income and illness-state
variables, and scenario adjustment and sample selection controls are included, in addition to
selected significant interaction terms involving the Canadian-sample indicator variable. The
results clearly show that differences between Canadians and u.s. individuals are apparent
across illness state prof.tles.
Perceived risk of disease affects the marginal utility of income differendy for
Canadians and u.s. individuals. While high perceived risk results in a lower marginal utility
of income for all respondents (and hence higher marginal rate of substitution between
income and illness states), low perceived risk results in a higher marginal utility of income for
only Canadians.35
Individuals from both countries who are highly confident in the quality of diagnosis
and treatment under their respective health care system have a higher marginal utility of
income and lower marginal rate of substitution, while Canadians who are less confident in
34 Under ideal circwnstances, every respondent would reveal subjective latencies that match the ones used in
the choice scenarios. They would each have a subjective life expectancy that matched the nominal life
expectancy for someone their age and gender that was used in their copy of the survey instrument. Finally, all
members of the recruitment pool would have equal propensities to show up in the estimating sample. Under
these conditions, all of the nuisance variables (expressed as deviations from their intended values) would be
zero, so I use zero values for these variables in the simulations..
35 Van Houtven (2008) offer a recent national survey that distinguishes between accident-related deaths and
cancer deaths, noting the presence of a cancer premiwn. Different types of health threats may be more or less
salient to different respondents.
~~--------------
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care efficacy have a higher marginal utility of income, and lower marginal rate of
substitution. This effect was only for those reporting a low (-1) but not the lowest (-2) level
of confidence. Therefore, Canadians who rank their health care system below average, but
have at least some confidence in the health care system seem to have different health-income
preferences than individuals from the u.s.
Canadians in general value avoided sickness years more than individuals from the
U.S. For both countries, however, subjectively reported risk of disease had a positive effect
on the marginal disutility of illness years (low risk has a positive effect on the marginal utility
of illness years, and high risk has a negative effect). Females for both countries have lower
aversion to sick years, while those who have significant opportunity to exercise more also
fear illness more. However, for Canadians, smoking has a strong effect on the marginal
disutility of becoming sick. Non-smokers, or those who have very litde opportunity to
reduce smoking, have substantially smaller disutilities associated with sick years.
For both countries, males tend to place litde marginal value to reducing the number
of recovered/remission years, while women from both countries (and the u.s. in particular)
are willing to pay to avoid recovered/remission years. This provides an interesting contrast:
for women, the morbidity still present in the recovered/remission state seems to matter,
whereas men appear to perceive recovered/remission years as fully recovered and providing
a level of utility equivalent to their pre-illness state. Men appear to attach value only to
avoided illness-years and avoided lost life-years.
Results for preferences over lost life years are particularly interesting (and comprise
the most significant part of overall willingness to pay for health risk reductions). In general,
age effects are substantially smaller for Canadians, and relatively pronounced for u.s.
individuals. Age affects both the baseline marginal utility of lost life years (the log-term) as
well as the degree of diminishing marginal utility over the number of lost life years across the
number of life years lost. Put simply, older individuals seem to value lost life years less, with
the value of any individual lost life year decreasing more with the number of years lost
overall. However, this age effect is almost (though not completely) offset by the opposite
sign for Canadians, suggesting that at least for the sample, Canadians exhibit smaller age
effects.
------ ._---------
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Having a college degree increases the marginal value attached to lost life years, while
being non-married reduces it; however, this effect is present only for u.s. respondents, with
the point estimates on the Canadian interaction terms almost exactly offsetting the effect.
For Canadians, having had experience with going outside of the provincial health plan for
diagnostic testing has a weakly significant and positive effect on the disutility of dying early.
Having confidence in the timeliness and quality of diagnosis has a positive effect on the
value attached to avoiding early death for u.s. individuals, but it appears to reduce the value
from avoided premature death for Canadians. For residents of both countries, a lack of
confidence in the health care system seems to reduce the marginal value attached to
reductions in lost life years. For the U.S., greater confidence in the timeliness and quality of
care may translate into higher willingness to pay for avoided lost life-years, but the effect is
not statistically significant. For Canadians, however, greater confidence in timely and high-
quality care seems to reduce the marginal value attached to avoiding early death. And [mally,
for both countries, subjective perception of being at low risk for the disease considered in
the choice set tends to lower the value attached to lost life year risk reduction, while
perception of being at high risk increases it.
Canadians and u.s. individuals exhibit strikingly different coefficients on the
interaction term between illness-years and lost life-years. While u.s. individuals derive
greater disutility from lost life-years after a longer period of illness, the opposite effect seems
to be present in Canada. For Canadians, the disutility from lost life-years is reduced as the
number of preceding illness-years increases. Thus, in Canada, it may be the case that a long
period of illness may evolve into a "fate worse than death."
Model 3 illustrates the importance of including a rich set of attitudinal, demographic
and survey design controls in modeling differences in preferences. Failure to control for
individual heterogeneity, in the presence of different types of respondents in the two
countries, can easily bias the coefficients on the interaction terms involving the indicator for
the Canadian sub-sample and imply that residence in the Canadian jurisdiction, per se,
somehow accounts for different preferences.
----- ---------
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5. Simulation Results
Based upon the preferred specification (Model 3), I simulate WTP for 1/1,000,000
risk reduction of sudden death for Canadian and U.S. individuals, males and females,
individuals with and without a college education, and those who are married or not married.
Additionally, for Canadian males, I simulate WTP for those with and without experience
with out-of-plan diagnostic testing procedures.
The simulations are benchmarked for average sample income in the U.S. (roughly
$42,000 U.S.). I assume a discount rate of 5%, and focus on the illness profile consisting of
sudden death in the current period (i.e. death with no latency and no prior illness) so that the
model's predictions can be compared to standard VSL estimates. Fitted WTP based on
Model 3 is calculated with subjective and attitudinal variables simulated at their median
values. These subjective and attitudinal variables include perceived risk of the illness or injury
in question for the corresponding program, opportunity to increase exercise, reduce
smoking, and see a doctor more regularly, and confidence in diagnosis and treatment under
Canadian or U.S. health systems.
For each type of simulation, I vary age in five year increments from 25 to 80 years to
permit graphing the implied age profile. In each case, 1000 random draws are taken from the
asymptotically joint normal distribution of the maximum likelihood parameter estimates.
This variability in parameter values, in combination with specified values for each of the
explanatory variables which appear in the model, allow generation of a distribution for WTP
that reflects the degree of precision in the estimated parameters.
Appendices III through VI present graphical depictions of the simulation results
across age groups-broken out by gender, educational attainment, marital status, and out-of-
plan experience. Individual figures show either 1) the median (solid line) and 5th and 95th
percentiles (dashed lines) for 1000 draws from the estimated joint distribution of parameters
calculated at each five-year age level between 25 and 80 years, or 2) just the median
simulated value, for each of several different types of individuals, to compare age profiles for
WTP across groups.
The age profile of WTP for sudden death is remarkably different. Canadians,
regardless of gender, education, or marital status, have a substantially flatter age profile of
WTP to reduce risk of early death, with peak WTP realized at a substantially older age (60
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for Canadians compared to 35-40 for individuals from the U.S.). In general Canadians are
WTP slightly more at older ages, but individuals from the U.S. are WTP substantially more
at younger ages. Across the 1000 sets of parameter draws, peak median WTP for Canadians
males is $9.17 annually (age 60), compared to $10.68 for males from the U.S. (age 35).36
Females have substantially lower WTP for risk reduction of sudden death regardless of
country of residence: a peak median WTP of $5.79 for U.S. females (age 35), and $3.17 for
Canadian females.
While males, and individuals from the U.S., are willing to pay more for health risk
reduction programs, college education and marital status goes a long way to explain the
U.S./Canadian gap. Those who are married and have a college degree reveal substantially
higher WTP in the U.S., but not in Canada. Peak median WTP for college-educated males in
the U.S. is $13.59 (age 35), and for unmarried males in the U.S. it is only $7.62 (age 35). By
contrast, peak median WTP for males in Canada is $8.55 (age 55) for those with a college
degree, and to $8.99 (age 55) for those who are unmarried.
Perhaps most striking result, however, is that the difference between Canadian and
U.S. male WTP values is almost entirely explained by Canadian experience with out-of-plan
medical diagnostic tests. Peak median WTP for Canadians with out-of-plan experience
jumps to $11.89 (age 60), with a fairly wide confidence band, and is well within the 90%
interval for U.S. males.
36 Aldy (2008) determine from age-specific hedonic wage equations that workers' VSLs rise from about $3.7
million between ages 18-24 to about $9.7 million in the 35-44 age bracket, then decline to about $3.4 million in
the 55-62 year old bracket. The question of age profiles ofWTP to reduce mortality risks is also addressed in
Krupnick (2007) and Aldy (2007).
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6. Conclusions
I have augmented an existing analysis of roughly 1800 U.S. survey respondents with
an independent sample of roughly 1000 Canadian respondents to an analogous survey. The
goal has been to assess the extent to which preferences for measures to reduce risks to life
and health might differ across the two countries. The sampling properties of the internet
consumer panel used for the Canadian survey (Ipsos Reid) is of somewhat lesser quality than
the consumer panel for the U.S. survey (Knowledge Networks), but both samples exhibit
distributions of age, gender, race, marital status, education and income that roughly match
the population distributions in each country. Differences may exist in terms of how
computer-savvy the respondents may be, especially among the older age groups. This stems
from the fact that Knowledge Networks recruits panelists using random digit dialed
telephone calls and equips non-internet-ready households with webTV equipment to permit
them to answer surveys, whereas the Ipsos Reid sample is recruited primarily via the internet.
I find significant differences between Canadian and U.S. individuals in the marginal
value of risk reduction programs, and these vary systematically with age, gender, education,
and marital status. Moreover, differences in attitudinal and subjective health perception
variables for the U.S. and Canadian samples account for small to large differences in
marginal utilities associated with health risk reduction programs. In particular, the extent to
which respondents felt they could get more regular exercise, or visit the doctor more
frequently, affects both U.S. and Canadian appetites for additional programs to reduce the
risks of different health threats, while being a non-smoker in Canada appears to substantially
reduce the marginal value attached to avoiding illness.
The age profJle ofWTP to reduce the risk of sudden death in the current period (the
risk reduction that maps most closely to a conventional VSL measure) is remarkably
different across the two countries. Canadians, regardless of gender, education, or marital
status, have a substantially flatter age profJle ofWTP to reduce risk of early death, with peak
WTP realized at a substantially older age (60 for Canadians compared to 35-40 for
individuals from the U.S.). Important gender differences are also seen for willingness to pay
to avoid recovered/remission years: women are willing to pay to avoid additional time in this
state, while men are not. This suggests that men, on average, view the recovered/remission
state as equivalent to their current (pre-illness) state. While males and individuals from the
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U.S. are willing to pay more for health risk reductions, educational attainment and marital
status go a long way to explain the u.S./Canadian gap. Those who are married and have a
college degree reveal substantially higher WTP in the U.S., but this is much less the case in
Canada.
Perhaps most strikingly, differences between Canadian and u.s. male WTP is almost
entirely explained by Canadian experience with out-of-plan diagnostic testing. Canadians
who have more experience with U.S.-style health care provision, by going outside their
provincial health plan to pay for services, convey preferences with respect to health risk
reductions which are more similar to those of U.S. respondents.
This study has shown that failure to control for individual heterogeneity, in the
presence of different types of respondents in the two countries, can easily bias the
coefficients on the interaction terms involving the indicator for the Canadian sub-sample
and imply that simply residence in Canada somehow accounts for different willingness to
pay for health risk reductions. Different patterns in sociodemographic and attitudinal
heterogeneity across the two countries account for a good deal of heterogeneity in choice
behavior in the experiments, but there remain many dimensions where there are further
differences that I can so far attribute only to the difference in jurisdictions, suggesting that
there are limits to "benefit transfers," in WTP estimates across jurisdictions. Of course, there
may still be other unobservable factors which differ across jurisdictions (e.g. other cultural
differences) that could explain remaining differences in WTP across the two countries.
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CHAPTER IV
CONNECTEDNESS AND BEHAVIOR
The degree of anonymity within a given social network should presumably impact an
individual's cognitive or emotive attachment to other individuals in their community. It has
been shown that large communities, where the degree of anonymity is high, generally have
lower participation in volunteer activities, work in public projects, and informal assistance to
friends and neighbors (putnam, 2000). Allcott, Karlan, Mobius, Rosenblat, and Szeidl (2007)
present evidence that the effect of community size on social engagement can be partially
explained through network structure. The extent to which one's network of friends is
interconnected determines the degree of "network closure" - or overlap between friends
within a social network. Smaller communities generally have a high degree of overlap
between friendship networks, and therefore an individual in a smaller community might be
more likely to feel deeper ties to his or her local community than those living in large
communities where the degree of overlap is generally small.
While Coleman (1990) was the first to suggest the theoretical connection between
network closure and outcomes, Allcott et al. (2007) present the flrst statistical evidence that
degree of network closure is negatively correlated with community size and signiflcantly
related to three outcomes: the degree to which an individual feels safe in their community
("How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "I feel safe in my
school"'), the propensity to get in trouble in school ("Since school started this year, how
often have you had trouble getting along with other students?"), and grade performance (as
measured by G.P.A. in math, science, English, and history).
I investigate the extent to which network closure is related to adolescent health
behaviors. A number of sociological and psychological studies have shown a negative
correlation between social isolation and measures self-efflcacy. Presumably, the degree of
62
anonymity within a given conununity affects an individual's attitudes toward engaging in
behaviors contributing to health risk. Both excessive alcohol and tobacco use are associated
with poor health outcomes, and have been shown to adversely impact labor market
outcomes (Renna, 2008). And, the extent to which anonymity affects these outcomes is
pertinent to informing policy geared toward reducing teen alcohol and tobacco use.
However, a large peer effects literature would suggest that the primary motivation
for alcohol and tobacco use is found in socially demarcated norms of acceptable behavior.
That is, being connected to a network of smokers or drinkers probably increases one's
propensity toward smoking or drinking. Independent of peer influence, however, there may
be a separate effect of feeling "well connected" that decreases one's propensity to engage in
self-destructive behavior. The degree of connectedness presumably impacts the strength of
social sanctions both for and against unhealthy behaviors. Whether or not there is an
independent effect of connectedness on health risk behavior, separate from peer influence,
remains a pertinent and valuable question.
It is nonetheless a difficult question to tease out empirically. The connectedness of a
social network is by def:mition the aggregate result of individual choice. To the extent that
friend selection is correlated with the choices underlying alcohol and tobacco use, or
contemporaneous behavior may have no direction of transmission, identifying a causal effect
of network structure on individual health behaviors is difficult.
Allcott et aL (2007) have presented suggestive evidence that the degree of
connectedness matters to feelings of self-efficacy and pro-social behavior. However, their
paper fails to adopt an identification strategy that is empirically defensible, and they make no
effort to disentangle peer effects from a more general measure of social connectedness. This
paper attempts to remedy these shortcomings. Through inclusion of peer-behavior and an
identification strategy which removes the lion's share of endogenous choice from the
empirical specification, I find that there is little evidence to suggest a separate and causal
impact of connectedness on health risk behavior, and evidence of a robust impact of peer
behavior on individual choice. In Section 1, I present a brief synopsis of the existing
literature, and highlight identification approaches advocated in recent research. Section 2
proceeds to describe the closure concept presented by Allcott et aL (2007) and used here,
while Section 3 describes the data used for empirical analysis. The methodology is outlined
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in section 4. I proceed to present replicated results of Allcott et aI. (2007) and alternative
specifications relevant to both outcomes presented in their paper, as well as smoking and
drinking behavior in Section 5. Section 6 presents results from empirical estimation utilizing
the panel structure of the data to better identify a causal impact, and Section 7 concludes.
1. Literature
As Bramoulle et aI. (2009) term it, in recent years there has been a "virtual
explosion" of literature on peer effects. Peer effects have been found in the propensity to
engage in criminal activity (Glaeser, 1996), teenage violence (Case and Katz, 1991), welfare
participation (Bertrand et aI., 2000), teen pregnancy (Evans et aI., 1992), retirement plan
participation (Saez and Duflo, 2003), saving (Duflo and Saez, 2002), labor force participation
(Woittiez and Kapteyn, 1998; and Aronsson et aI., 1999), extracurricular choice (Bramoulle
et aI., 2009), and school achievement (Hoxby, 2000; Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003;
Fertig, 2003; Hanushek et aI., 2003; and Arcidiacono and Nicholson, 2005).37 In the health
field, much of the literature has relied on the AddHealth data to show peer effects on obesity
(Christakis and Fowler, 2007; and Trogdon et aI., 2008), alcohol use (Kremer and Levy,
2008), and alcohol, tobacco, and drug use (Lundborg, 2006; and Clark and Loheac, 2006).
These papers have all found significant effects, and highlight some of the challenges in
identification.
The problem of identification is probably best presented in Manski's (1993) seminal
paper where he distinguishes between endogenouJ, exogenOUJ, and correlated effects in social
interactions. While endogenous effects (the influence of peer behaviors) and exogenous
effects (the influence of peer characteristics) are descriptive of social interactions, correlated
effects (where an individual's behavior is influenced by commonly shared characteristics of
the group) are confounding factors separate (but correlated with) social interactions which
should be empirically specified. Even if data exist which are rich enough to control for
correlated effects, distinguishing between endogenous and exogenous effects has been the
major hurdle. In what Manski termed the riflection problem, simultaneity in behavior makes it
difficult to isolate exogenous (causal) effects from endogenous behavior. To the extent that
37For recent surveys of the literature in tills field, see Blume and Durlauf (2005), and Soetevent (2006).
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my own behavior influences the behavior of my peer reference group, inferring a causal
relationship of my peers' behaviors on my own is troubling.
Insufficient care in identification has received harsh criticism in the economics
literature. For example, in response to Christakis and Fowler (2007), Cohen-Cole et al.
(2008a) ftnd that omission of confounding environmental factors which overlap with the
decisions of network members, and failure to use lagged peer characteristics, result in the
spurious suggestion that network similarity in weight transmits obesity. Further, Cohen-Cole
et al. (2008b) test omission of these contextual factors on specifications showing peer effects
in such implausible things as acne, headache prevalence, and height on network similarity,
and find significant results when contextual effects are omitted, and insignificant results
when contextual effects are included.
More successful studies have used a variety of identification approaches. As Kremer
and Levy (2008) point out, it may be the case that individuals within social groups converge
due to unobserved similarities, or have come together to achieve similar outcomes, rather
than influence each others' behavior. In their paper, Kremer and Levy utilize a random
lottery assignment of roommates at a large state university, and the lag of roommate (peer)
behavior to isolate the exogenous formation of peer groups (random assignment) and
contemporaneous choice (propensity to drink prior to enrollment), from exogenous peer
effects in alcohol use and school performance. For males, they find significant peer effects
in both use of alcohol and school performance, but interestingly enough find no effects of
family background characteristics of roommates.
Other recent work has appealed to the "arrow of rime," exploitable in increasingly
rich and available panel datasets. Clark and Loheac (2007) investigate the social influence of
peers in tobacco, alcohol, and marijuana use with AddHealth data. They build upon the
standard linear model for peer interaction offered in Pollak (1976), using the lag of peer
group behavior, and school fixed-effects to isolate plausibly exogenous variation between
grade cohorts of "peer" behavior. By lagging peer group behavior they "avoid one aspect of
the reflection problem: while my behavior may depend on what my peers did in the past,
their past behavior cannot depend on what I currently do," (767). Moreover, in addition to
controlling for school fixed effects (and thereby, any non-rime-varying trends in unobserved
characteristics that are shared among adolescents in a given school, or characteristics of the
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school itself which may affect behavior), they include individual-level contextual controls for
parent smoking, drinking and drug behavior, as well as individual school choice by whether
the student was a recent mover and whether the parent's choice of neighborhood was
influenced by the local school's characteristics. Finally, they vary the reference group's
composition (both same grade, and grade above the individual student), arguing that it is less
likely that the older cohorts will respond to the behavior of their younger peers, as well as
allowing for non-linear effects by using split sample techniques. They fmd strong peer
effects in smoking and drinking behavior, which vary in magnitude by sex, but little evidence
of peer effects in marijuana use.
Finally, Bramoulle et al. (2009) provide a theoretical econometric insight inspired by
spatial econometric theory, and apply their theory to AddHealth data. They show that it is
possible to fmd groups of networks with sufficient structure to identify a causal peer effect.
Provided that there exists a networked grouping of friends who are linked in such a way that
within that grouping there exist "friends of an individual's friend with whom that individual
is not also a friend," the characteristics of the friends-once-removed can be used to
instrument for the behavior of the individual's own friend. The authors give the example of
an "intransitive triad," with a set of students i, j, k, where i is affected by j, and j is affected
by k, but i is not affected by k, as the type of network structure exploitable for identification.
They apply their econometric model to the AddHealth data, and fmd significant exogenous
peer effects in extracurricular choice among students for the sub-sample for which this
identification methodology was relevant.
While much has been written on peer effects, the literature on the effect of
connectedness on individual behavior is thin. Other than Allcott et al. (2007), to my
knowledge, only one paper has been published which identifies a separate and causal effect
of the degree of connectedness on labor (or health) behavior. Babcock (2008) uses a simple
measure of connectedness (the sum of nominated friends and nominations as a friend of
others) as a key variable to explain educational attainment, employing much the same
identification strategy as in Clark and Loheac (2007). They remove the influence of an
individual's own linkages in a mean grade-cohort measure of interconnectedness to present a
plausibly exogenous measure of connectedness, exploit the panel structure of AddHealth to
lag reference group connectedness as explanatory of current individual behavior, and rely on
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school fixed effects to control for unobserved contextual effects. They fInd connectedness
of the grade-cohort (minus an individual's own influence) matters significantly to educational
attainment decisions later in life. These fIndings are motivated by the notion that there are
consumption effects in schooling: those well connected in high school gain higher utility
from schooling when they are well connected (perhaps due to social benefits or working
together, and/or participation in non-academic exercises within or outside of schooling).
2. Network Closure
While Babcock (2008) presents some intriguing results, their measure for
connectedness is rather coarse, and fundamentally grade-school specific. Although he
employs an instrumental variables specification with grade-school nominations as an
instrument for individual connectedness, he does not attempt to confIne the analysis to a
pertinent sphere of friends. It is important to stress the notion of a pertinent sphere of
friends. It very well may be that if we take no account for the number of "degrees of
separation" between people, an individual in a particular grade, in a particular school, very
well may be connected to everyone else in that particular grade and particular school. Under
such an approach, no attempt is made to capture the degree of interconnection that
individual has within his socialfy relevant group of friends - i.e. those people surrounding the
person who may (or may not) impact his behavior choices, and/or give him a sense of being
"well-connected" or "popular." Allcott et al. (2007) offer a direct and individual-specific
measure for social connectedness, which is bounded to a pertinent sphere of social
connection. I adopt their measure for network closure, which was first outlined in Mobius
and Szeidl (2006).
I begin with several definitions necessary to understand the metric. DefIne a node as
a location-specific point associated with an individual (or "agent') within a social network of
friends. Further defIne an edge as a pairwise connection between two immediately adjacent
nodes. DefIne a path as a sequence of contiguous edges linking any two nodes sand t
(otherwise called "agents') within the social network of friends. A trust flow indicates the
degree of connection between any two agents. Specifically, let a trust flow between two
agents sand t be defIned as the number of disjoint paths connecting sand t. A path is
disjoint if each edge is assigned a flow capacity equal to 1, such that between any two agents,
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the set of all potential paths connecting the two agents cannot use a particular edge in the
network more than once. To limit the sphere of friends to a relevant network size, all edges
in a path must be within distance K from agent s. Any edge can be assigned a value denoting
distance from agent s. First, the minimum distance to each node defIning a particular edge
can be taken as the length (number of edges) of the shortest path originating from s to reach
the node. Total distance to the edge is, therefore, the simple average of the minimum
distance to each node.
Given the above preliminaries, the formal defmition of network closure can be
presented. For any positive integer m, network closure (m,K) for agent s can be computed as
the share of total trust between s and all other agents, comprised of paths within distance K,
that have pairwise trust flows exceeding m. High closure values have a greater proportion of
total trust originating from pairwise connections with a high degree of trust, while low
closure has a greater proportion of total trust originating from pairwise connections with a
low degree of trust.
Take, for example, six connected individuals - Tom, Sally, Mary, Paul, Mark, and
Eric. Suppose these individuals form friendship connections in two distinct ways, as shown
in Figure 6. We are interested in computing the closure of Tom. In the fIrst diagram, Tom
has nominated (or been nominated by) Sally and Mary as direct friends. Sally nominated (or
was nominated by) both Tom and Paul, while Mary nominated (or was nominated by) both
Tom and Mark. Eric, at the top of the diagram, is directly linked to both Mark and Paul. If
we can use paths connecting these individuals once, and there was no restriction on the
circle of trust size, we could get to each of these individuals one of two ways (go either
direction in the connected circle, and we can get to each of these people in two ways using
the linkage path edges each only once). But, if we are interested in computing trust between
Tom and each of the other individuals, but only with a circle of trust size K = 1.5, the paths
connecting Eric and Mark and Eric and Paul must be excluded. To see why, note that Paul
is two people removed from Tom, as is Mark. Eric is three people removed from Tom.
Therefore, the path connecting Eric to Mark is on average 2.5 people away from Tom
because one node defIning this edge is a distance 3 from Tom and the other is a distance 2
from Tom. The same is the case for the edge connecting Eric and Paul. Therefore, there is
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no path within a distance of 1.5 connecting Tom to Eric, and so "trust" between Tom and
Eric is zero.
Moreover, because we cannot use these two edges between Mark and Eric and Paul
and Eric to compute different paths connecting the other people to Tom (within a distance
of 1.5 from Tom), there are no longer two complete paths connecting the other individuals
in the network. There is only one direct path connecting,Tom to Sally, Tom to Mary, Tom
to Mark, and Tom to Paul. Therefore, from Tom's perspective, there is a flow of trust to
each of these people equal to 1. If closure is the proportion of total trust (here equal to 4)
greater than m==1, closure is zero in the fIrst example.
Figure 6: Network Closure for Simplified Networks, with K=1.5, and m=l
Eric - 0 Eric - 0
0 /O~Mark-l / ~ Paul-l Mark- 0 Paul- 0
o 0 o 0
Sally - 1 Mary-l
,/ Sally - 2 o 0 Mary-2V.-
s-Tom s-Tom
Low Closure High Closure
Source: Alkott et al. (2007). Numbers assigned to each node represent the trust flow
from agent s to each individual/node in the network. In the left panel, network
closure (1.5,1) for agent s (Tom) would be zero, while in the right panel, network
closure would be 1. Note that, in the left panel, trust flow between agent s and the
top-most individual is 0, because either edge needed to connect s to this node is of
distance 2.5 from s.
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In the second example, friendship nominations are quite different. While Tom is
friends with both Sally and Mary, and Sally and Mary are both friends, none of these people
are friends with the other sub-group (who are similarly linked). Clearly from Tom's
perspective, Mark, Paul and Eric have zero trust (there is no direct path connecting them),
while there are two ways of getting to both Sally and Mary (all paths connecting Tom to
Mary, Tom to Sally, and Sally to Mary are within a distance of 1.5, since the paths connecting
Tom to Sally and Tom to Mary are each 0.5 away from Tom, while the path connecting
Mary and Sally is on average 1.5 away since the first node is 1 away, and the second node is 2
away). If closure is the proportion of total trust greater than m=1, all of the nodes with
positive trust (i.e., people sufflciently close to Tom to be included in the computation) have
trust greater than 1, and so closure equals 1.
3. Data
The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (AddHealth) was
administered to all students in 142 schools in the United States, with responses totaling
roughly 86,000 individuals in grades 7-12 during the 1994-95 school year. The initial survey
used systematic sampling methods with implicit stratification, and was followed by three
subsequent waves, the most recent of which was conducted in 2008. The survey includes
data on respondents' social, economic, psychological and physical well-being, with
contextual data on the family, neighborhood, community, school, friendships, peer groups,
and romantic relationships - all of which were derived from a combination of respondent-
specific in-home and in-school questionnaires, a school administrator questionnaire, and a
parent questionnaire. While the in-school survey (pencil and paper) was administered to all
respondents (and administrator questionnaire to all schools), the in-home and parent surveys
(audio computer-assisted self-interviewing) were administered to a 1:5 sample of all
respondents. The survey data includes respondent-identified names of up to 10 friends,S
male and 5 female.38 These friends are linked in a friendship network me, allowing for
computation of measures of network structure.
38 Inherent in survey design is top-coding of friend respondents - that is, if a respondent named 5 friends,
either male or female, it is plausible and even likely that that person is friends with more than five people of the
same sex. I include a crude control for this inherent limitation in survey design by including dummy variables
for overall top coding (10 friends nominated), and male/female friend top coding.
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4. Methodology
While Babcock (2008) fmds an effect of connectedness on length of schooling using
a relatively simple measure for connectedness. To date, however, there has not been an
attempt to isolate a casual effect on health behavior. The model specifications presented in
Allcott et aL (2007) offer a useful starting point from which to study the effects of
connectedness on behavior. Using data from the in-school AddHealth sample39, I first adopt
their specification relating community size (as measured by a student's grade size) to network
closure. For individual respondent i and student grade sizeJ; i € j:
c10surei =Of + ~ community sizej + y controls j + C, (10)
where controls; include background and demographic controls for father's education and race,
and so-called fractionalization controls as motivated in the literature.40 Additionally,
equation (10) is expanded to include friend fiXed-effects and grade fiXed-effects in later
specifications. Outcome specifications follow the third model specification in Alcott et aL
(2007), including closure as the key variable, and controlling for community size:
outcome j = () + ecommunity sizej + Q c10surei + ycontrols j + U. (11)
As Allcott et aL (2007) admit, it is difficult to identify a causal relationship between
network structure, community size, and outcomes, since it would be impossible to control of
all factors which are jointly correlated with explanatory variable(s) and the outcome of
interest. Although they "attempt to alleviate these [omitted variable] concerns by including a
rich set of controls, such as social and economic factors, in all regressions," they admit "we
cannot fully rule out alternative explanations, however, and hence we interpret the fmdings
from the analysis about closure and outcomes above as suggestive evidence." The
availability of individual response data across a representative sample of schools, allow for
39 The in-school sample has the advantage of having been administered to a larger collection of high school
students. However, it was only administered once, in Wave 1, and for a limited set of questions. Further
identification strategies are explored below.
40 Fractionalization is the probability that two people chosen randomly from the grade/school will be of
different categories. Inclusion of these controls is advocated in Alesina and Laferrera (2003).
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the inclusion of fIxed effects (Babcock, 2008; and Clark and Loheac, 2007). Moreover, the
unbalanced sample of respondents from schools of varying size, which has been shown to
yield bias interval estimates, can be further accommodated by common econometric
techniques. To build on equation (11), I include a host of additional controls, revised
variable specification, fIxed effects, and clustering at the school level to mediate some of
these defIciencies.41 These models can then be extended to outcomes of smoking and
drinking behavior.
Incorporating these adjustments, a linear model of individual behavior on behavior
outcomes can be expressed as follows, for individual i:
(12)
where: 0; = outcome variable (Allcott et aI., 2007 outcomes, smoking and drinking)
\I. =constant
~ = friendship network size deviation from mean \I.
y = school-specifIc deviation from mean \I.
X; = vector of individual-specific contextual controls
Z; =vector of individual-specifIc controls, and
N; = degree of network closure.
Since the sizable peer effects literature has focused on the role of social networks in
establishing behavioral norms, it is important to control for peer behavior for a separate
"connectedness" effect to be identifIed. Omission of peer effects known to influence
behavior could potentially bias estimated results from any specification of outcomes on
41 Variable defInition was found to be a key concern in the Allcott et al. (2007) study. A number of categorical
variables (including outcome variables for "feel safe" in their community and getting in "trouble" in school)
were unadjusted from an arbitrary scale weighting. Generally, these variables are best converted to discrete
variables, both to ameliorate concerns about specifIcation bias, as well as interpretation of results. Additionally,
treatment of missing data was not handled rigorously in their study, and as such, I was not able to replicate
their sample size. For the purposes of expanded specifIcations based upon the in school sample, I treat missing
and "refused to comment" data as missing, such that these observations are dropped from the analysis when
appropriate. Finally, closure was computed for a larger number of individuals in Allcott et al. (2007) than could
be supported by friendship nomination data received from University of North Carolina as ofAugust 2007
(that is, if an individual neither nominates friends contained in the sample, nor is nominated by others in the
sample, closure cannot be computed). Sample sizes differ in the analyses; but parameter estimates are similar,
both in terms of magnitude and signifIcance.
---------------------
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network closure if closure is correlated with peer level behavior. However, aforementioned
identification outlined in the peer effects literature needs to be adequately addressed. I use
the calculation of trust flows from the closure computation and level of peer behavior for
peers contained within the sample to compute a trust-weighted average of peer behavior for
each individual i. To the extent that an individual chooses their friends based upon their
friend's behavior, endogeneity bias will remain. Therefore, I remove the level effect of
direcdy nominated friends from the trust-weighted average of peer level behavior, and
include this value as an independent control in equation (12) regressions for all Allcott et al.
(2007) outcomes, as well as drinking and smoking:42
(13)
where 0; is a vector of each individual's trust-weighted aggregation of peer level behavior.
However, by definition, individual choice matters to network formation. One
chooses who their friends are, and they may even choose their friends for the friends with
whom their friends are friends. If friend selection is correlated with a behavior of interest
(such as a friend choosing a group of individuals who are socially active, and perhaps more
prone to drink), what appears as the influence of being connected on the behavior (drinking)
may well simply be a reflection of the individual's choice. Moreover, network formation
happens in a contemporaneous fashion: friends choose each other simultaneously. I take
two approaches to remedy (at least in part) this potential for endogeneity.
To begin with, the exogenous choice of K, the network of immediate and pertinent
friends, allows for an obvious and powerful instrument. The average degree of network
closure of all friends immediately adjacent to those within distance K, but excluded from the
closure computation by the researcher-defmed selection of K, will be strongly correlated with
42 Includ1ng this measure of peer behavior as an explanatory control variable is somewhat of an adhoc version
of the identification suggested by Bramoulle et al. (2009). However, 1) since trust flow is computed based
upon the inclusion of direct friends, 2) to the extent that direct friends influence the level of trust of friends of
friends, and 3) if the structure of a given individual's friendship network does not fulf1l1 the intransitivity
assumption upon which Bramoulle et al. (2009)'s identification is based, these measures will likely be at least
partially endogenous. Therefore, interpretation of estimated coefficients for peer-level variables should be
made with care, and results interpreted as suggestive of a relationship, and not necessarily causal. I argue
however, that these measures are reasonably removed from direct bias associated with friend selection, and
provides for sufficient control of peer effects for the primary aim of identifying an effect of closure on
behavior.
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any particular individual's degree of closure, but is presumably removed (to a large degree)
from the potentially behavior-related and contemporaneous selection of friends. I estimate
equation (13) using a two stage model (least squares for continuous dependent variables, and
maximum likelihood for discrete cases), with the average closure beyond K as an instrument
for N;, the individual's degree of network closure (m,K).
Second, I follow much of the peer effects literature, utilizing the panel nature of the
data as follows:
(14)
To the extent that an individual's friend's behavior in Wave I of the survey cannot
be dependent upon that individual's Wave III behavior, I avoid much of the riflection problem.
However, in the case of behaviors which have an addiction aspect (in particular, smoking),
endogenous effects could persist into Wave III, if behavior is fully established by Wave 1.
Therefore, I specify models pertaining to health behavior in Wave III as conditional on
having not smoked (or consumed alcohol) in Wave I as follows:
The interpretation of the effect of Wave I closure on Wave III behavior is modified
to one of whether connectedness while in school contributed to the propensity to engage
this behavior later in life, having not smoked in Wave 1. However, these results cannot be
applied to all individuals, since the decision to abstain from smoking (or drinking) early in
life is most likely associated with behavior later in life.43
43 I would posit, however, that these characteristics are negatively correlated with the decision to smoke later in
life, yielding attenuation bias in the estimated results.
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5. Empirical Results
5.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 12 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the replication of
results in Allcott et al. (2007). Dependent variables used in the replication include Feelsafe,
Trouble, and Grade Point Average (GPA) as defmed in their study. On average,
respondents feel relatively safe in their C01ll1llunity (although this measure is subjective to
each respondent's interpretation of the five-point scale).44 In general, students infrequently
get in trouble with other students in their school. Responses to this question were 0 for
Table 12: In School Summary Statistics
Std.
Akott et al. (2001) Obs 1Iean Dev. NIin Max
Dependent Variables
Feelsafe in community 68,341 3.690 1.065 1 5
Trouble in school 73,039 1.531 1.460 0 4
Grade point average 67,571 2.672 1.006 0 4.0
Interest Variables
Closure (m=2, k=2.0) 77,020 0.603 0.355 0 1
Size of Student's Class (per 100 students) 77,020 2.727 1.476 0.10 6.97
Demographic Controls
Race: Caucasian 77,020 0.529 0
Father education (less than high school) 77,020 0.081 0
Father education (high school diploma) 77,020 0.209 0
Father education (some college) 77,020 0.349 0
Location and Fractionalization Controls
Location: Suburban 77,020 0.569 0 1
Location: Rural 77,020 0.103 0 1
Fractionalization: Grade 77,020 0.700 0.109 0.037 0.834
Fractionalization: Race 77,020 0.328 0.143 0 0.5
Fractionalization: Education 77,020 0.798 0.124 0.159 0.997
Source: AddHeath Wave 1, In School Sample 1994-1995
"never," 1 for "just a few times," 2 for "about once a week," 3 for "almost everyday," and 4
for "everyday." However, the average is between "just a few times" and "once a week,"
where a weekly occurrence of "getting in trouble with other students" could be burdensome
(depending on what "trouble" means to each student). The bounded continuous range for
GPA follows the usual 4.0 scale, with students on average doing better than a typical 2.0
average.
44 Following Allcott et al. (2007), I recode responses to 5 for "strongly agree" and 1 for "strongly disagree."
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Table 13 presents reclassified descriptive statistics for all variables from the Wave I
in-school sample used in the empirical analysis. In particular, ordinal variables for Feelsafe
and Trouble are recast as discrete dependent variables, where Feelsafe= 1 if the respondent
"agreed" or "strongly agreed" to "feeling safe" their school, and Trouble=l if the
respondent "got in trouble" once a week or more. While most (63 percent) students felt safe
in their school, a sizable 36 percent of students get in trouble with other students as regularly
as once a week or more.
Variables Smoke and Drink are converted to discrete variables as well to account for
unequal intervals of answers available to the respondents. A sizable 17 percent of students
in the sample smoked at least three times per week or more in the previous month, while a
larger-than-expected 45 percent of these students had not consumed alcohol in the last year.
On average, students have a relatively high degree of network closure (defined here and in all
specifications using m=2 and k=2.0). A full 60 percent of trust within a distance of k=2.0
(roughly speaking, this includes 3 to 4 friends once removed) comes from nodes with three
or more paths of interconnection. This average appears to be slightly higher than presented
in Allcott et al. (2007),45 although their analysis appears to include observations for which
closure is zero due to having nominated no friends. Here, and in all subsequent analysis, I
exclude these observations since they could mean many things: it could be that the student
really isn't interconnected, or alternatively, the survey was not filled out completely, and we
have very limited information on their actual friendship network, or their nominated friends
were not included in either the in-home interviews or in-school survey (for example, if the
student's friends were both absent on the day of the school survey was administered, and
was also not selected for the in-home interview, they would be excluded from the sample
upon which closure is computed).
45 Although Allcott et al. (2007) do not include descriptive statistics in their paper, they include a graph of
closure against friendship size. Using a back-of-the-envelop calculation for the average number of friends
nominated, I guess their average to be rougWy between 0.40 and 0.50 for closure (2,2).
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Table 13: Reclassified In School Summary Statistics
Std.
Respecijication Obs Mean Dev. Nlln Max
Dependent Variables
Feelsafe (1 = agree or strongly agree) 62,276 0.634 0 1
Trouble (1 = at least once a week) 66,430 0.363 0 1
Grade point average 61,553 2.680 1.001 0.0 4.0
Smoke (1 = 3 or more times a week) 69,737 0.173 0 1
Drink (1 = never drank in last 12 months) 65,736 0.446 0 1
Interest Variables
Closure (m=2, k=2.0) 62,276 0.615 0.349 0 1
Size of Student's Class (per 100 students) 62,276 2.737 1.491 0.10 6.97
Feelsafe (peer-weighted) 62,276 0.489 0.168 0 1
Trouble (peer-weighted) 62,276 0.275 0.132 0 1
GPA (peer-weighted) 62,276 2.010 0.563 0 4.0
Smoke (peer-weighted) 62,276 0.125 0.115 0 1
Drink (peer-weighted) 62,276 0.336 0.168 0 1
Demographic Controls
Age of respondent (\Vave 1) 62,276 15.107 1.670 10 19
Age-sqrd of respondent (Wave 1) 62,276 231.001 50.145 100 361
Sex: Male = 1, Female =0 62,276 0.478 0 1
Race: 1 = African American 62,276 0.161 0 1
Race: 1 = Hispanic Ethnicity 62,276 0.098 0 1
Race: 1 = Asian or Pacific Islander 62,276 0.047 0 1
Race: 1 = American Indian 62,276 0.007 0 1
Race: 1 = Other non-white 62,276 0.012 0 1
Race: 1 = Multicultural 62,276 0.128 0 1
Father education Oess than high school) 62,276 0.079 0 1
Father education (some college) 62,276 0.113 0 1
Father education (bachelor degree) 62,276 0.165 0 1
Father education (grad school) 62,276 0.095 0 1
Father education (uncertain) 62,276 0.065 0 1
j\fother education Oess than high school) 62,276 0.097 0 1
Mother education (some college) 62,276 0.152 0 1
Mother education (bachelor degree) 62,276 0.195 0 1
Mother education (grad school) 62,276 0.077 0 1
Mother education (uncertain) 62,276 0.065 0 1
Location and Fractionalization Controls
Region: West 62,276 0.186 0 1
Region: Midwest 62,276 0.207 0 1
Region: South 62,276 0.447 0 1
Region: Northeast 62,276 0.159 0 1
Location: Suburban 62,276 0.566 0 1
Location: Rural 62,276 0.104 0 1
Fractionalization: Grade 62,276 0.703 0.105 0 0.833
Fractionalization: Race 62,276 0.484 0.187 0 0.815
Fractionalization: Father's education 62,276 0.874 0.059 0.447 0.996
Friend Truncation Controls
Total friend truncation 62,276 0.415 0 1
Male friend truncation 62,276 0.554 0 1
Female friend truncation 62,276 0.555 0 1
Source: AddHeath Wave 1, In School Sample 1994-1995. Redassification indudes coding missing and refused observations
for variables correctfy, categorical treatment ifordinal variables where appropriate, and exduding observations for which
insujjicientfriend linkage information was available to compute dOSHre.
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In Table 14, I present descriptive statistics for all variables used in the in-home
sample. By Wave 3, where respondents were between the ages of 18 and 28, about a third of
the sample had smoked cigarettes, and on average respondents drank five or more drinks in
one sitting 20 times in the previous year. I include a similar measure for peer weighted
drinking behavior in Wave 1, and a continuous variable for peer-weighted Wave 1 smoking
behavior.
Attrition from Wave I in the Wave 3 sample is relatively high (about three out of
four from the Wave 1 sample responded to the Wave 3 survey). The extent to which this
selection into Wave 3 could bias estimated results is not examined; suggestive evidence is
that the propensity to drop out of the sample is not strongly correlated with health risk
behavior or key observables. For example, 58 percent of those in Wave 1 who did not
participate in Wave 3 had reported smoking at some point in their life, compared to 57
percent for the entire sample. About 48 percent of those not responding to the Wave 3
survey had consumed alcohol in the prior twelve months as of Wave 1, compared to 47.5
percent for the entire sample. Additionally, parental income (as reported in Wave 1) was
about $44,000/year for drop outs, compared to roughly 46,000/year for the entire sample.
There were minimal differences in terms of age and sex as well.46 However, it is worth
noting that there is a stronger representation of minorities in the Wave 3 sample than
observed in the in-school sample due to intentional over-sampling by AddHealth.
Additional controls are included for parent smoking behavior, and neighborhood
selection as advocated in Babcock (2008). Roughly a third of parents smoked and/or drank
alcohol and parental use of illegal drugs was relatively uncommon. About 43 percent of the
sample had moved to their current residence within the 5 years prior to the Wave 1 sample
period, and only 12 percent of parents chose the neighborhood location primarily for the
local school's perceived quality.
46 Sample selection controls are not included, and selection models are not employed to date. However, these
may be explored in the future.
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Table 14: In Home Summary Statistics
Std.
Obs 11ean Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
Bachelor Degree 12,778 0.119 0 1
Smoke (Wave 3) 12,768 0.326 0 1
Drink 5 or More (\V'ave 3) 12,727 19.924 50.745 0 365
Interest Variables
closure_20 12,768 0.632 0.362 0 1
GPA (peer-weighted) 12,768 0.846 0.676 0 4
Smoke (\V'ave 1 peer-weighted) 12,768 0.502 1.093 0 40
Drink 5 or more (\V'ave 1 peer-weighted) 12,768 0.072 0.151 0 6
Demographic Controls
Age of respondent (Wave 1) 12,768 15.593 1.714 11 21
Age-squared of respondent (Wave 1) 12,768 246.069 53.116 121 441
Sex: Male = 1, Female =0 12,768 0.467 0 1
Race: 1 = African American 12,768 0.219 0 1
Race: 1 = American Indian 12,768 0.035 0 1
Race: 1 = Asian or Pacific Islander 12,768 0.086 0 1
Race: 1 = Hispanic Ethnicity 12,768 0.158 0 1
Race: 1 = Multicultural 12,768 0.128 0 1
Race: 1 = Other non-white 12,768 0.012 0 1
Parent education (less than high school) 12,768 0.133 0 1
Parent education (high school) 12,768 0.259 0 1
Parent education (some college) 12,768 0.253 0 1
Parent education (bachelor degree) 12,768 0.129 0 1
Parent education (grad school) 12,768 0.085 0 1
Religion: Weekly Attendance 12,768 0.401 0 1
Religion: Monthly Attendance 12,768 0.199 0 1
Religion: Some Attendance 12,768 0.178 0 1
Location Controls
Unemployment Rate (County) 12,768 0.068 0.023 0.026 0.145
Proportion Urbanized (County) 12,768 0.637 0.395 0 1
Proportion Rural (County) 12,768 0.250 0.275 0 1
Parent Behavior
Parents Drink 12,768 0.304 0 1
Parent Drug Use 12,768 0.031 0 1
Parents Smoke 12,768 0.307 0 1
Neighborhood Selection
Moved since 1990 12,768 0.431 0 1
Parents Chose Neighborhood for Schools 12,768 0.121 0 1
Friend Controls
Friend Nomination (total) 12,768 2.994 2.555 0 10
Friend Nomination (in sample) 12,768 1.827 2.021 0 10
Soun"li:AddHealth Wave 1 and3, in-home sample, 1994-1995 and 2003.
5.2. Empirical Results
In Table 15, I present replicated results for the effects of network closure on
community size as presented in Allcott et al. (2007). Although I was not able to replicate
sample size, primarily due to insufficient friendship nomination data, the sample sizes, as
well as the degree and magnitudes of estimated coefficients, are similar.47 The first four
models follow their published results, while the fifth specification includes clustering at the
school level to account for the unbalanced paneL As with Allcott et al. (2007), I fmd a
strong negative relationship between closure and student class size.
Table 15: A11cott et al. (2007) Closure and Community Size Results
Closure m=2, k=2.0, dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
model 4 +
modell model2 model3 model4 dust
Size of Student's Class
-.05007 -.04719 -.03582 -.03457 -.03457
(59.64)** (62.87)** (45.27)** (42.33)** (4.16)**
Constant
.7384 .7306 .4862 .3852 .1088
(284.48)** (314.82)** (37.10)** (18.90)** (0.68)
Friend fIxed-effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fIxed-effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Background/demographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Fractionalization controls No No No Yes Yes
Observations 77463 77463 77463 77463 77463
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.28
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signifIcant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Replicated results for outcomes Feelsafe, Trouble, and GPA are presented in Table
16. The first specifications for each dependent variable follow the last specification in
Allcott et al. (2007), including both friend nomination fixed effects, as well as
fractionalization controls. As with the closure-on-community size results, the initial
specification produce results which are similar in magnitude and strongly significant as
reported in their study. High closure is associated with a higher propensity to feel safe at
school, a lower propensity to get in trouble with other students at school, and improved
academic performance.
47 See footnote 42.
79
Table 16: Allcott et al. (2007) "Prosocial" Outcome Results
Feelsafc Troubl Grad
Closure (m=2, k=2.0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
FE and FE and FE and
Allcott Clust Clust IV Allcott Clust Clust IV Allcott Clust Clust IV
-.01987 -.01987 .02113 -.01786 -.02957 -.02957 .095 -.03466
(6.59)** (1.26) (1.74) (1.00) (7.38)** (3.06)** (5.36)** (3.63)**
Friend ftxed-effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade fixed-effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background/demographic
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fractionalization controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School ftxed-effects
No No Yes No No No Yes No
Observations 68676 68676 68676 68199 73398 73398 73398 72875
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* signiftcant at 5%; ** signiftcant at 1%
Size of Student's Class
.2238
(16.86)**
.2238
(7.20)**
.2369
(9.92)**
.42
(3.29)**
-.1643
(9.36)**
-.1643
(7.81)**
-.1629
(8.09)**
-.125
(1.34)
.2923 .2923 .3235 .3994
(23.68)** (8.11)** (14.70)** (2.31)*
-.02441 -.02441 -.08202 -.Q308
(8.70)** (1.30) (5.52)** (1.74)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
No No Yes No
67881 67881 67881 67374
0.09 0.10 0.06 0.09
00
o
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Subsequent specifications include clustering at the school level, inclusion of fixed
effects and instrumenting for closure with the closure of connected schoolmates beyond the
researcher-defmed circle of trust K. Except for the Trouble variable, magnitude and
significance of Feelsafe and GPA on closure are relatively unaffected by additional controls
for contextual factors (school flXed effects), error correction (clustering), or endogeneity
(instrumentation for closure). The loss of significance on the propensity to get in trouble in
school for the instrumental variables specification is telling: it suggests that the mechanism
by which connectedness affects prosocial behavior is directed in certain ways. While
connectedness seems to matter to the cognitive perception of one's own safety in school and
school performance, it has less of an effect on one's own propensity to get in trouble with
other students. It is possible that the effect of network structure on individual choice may
be more of a "social norm" story for Trouble, and more of a personal attachment (or
"connectedness") story for Feelsafe and GPA. That is, the "level effect" of peer behavior
could establish social norms for trouble-laden behavior, while success and comfort in school
is affected both by the level effect of peer safety perceptions and school performance, but
independendy by the degree of connectedness to school peers.
Table 17 presents results for an expanded set of controls, and inclusion of peer-
weighted levels for the dependent variable of interest. Additional controls are included for
education (the educational attainment for both the mother and father, re-specified for
missing refused responses), race controls (for race and ethnicity beyond just Caucasian and
re-specified for missing refused responses), religion (monthly, weekly, or some attendance),
and fractionalization (education and race include the full set of categories included in these
data).
When the level effect of peer behavior is included in the specification, connectedness
seems to once again matter to all three prosocial outcomes. It is possible that omission of
peer behavior, added demographic controls, and improved variable measurement induced
omitted variables bias. Clearly, an effect of closure on the likelihood to get into trouble with
other students in one's own school is found only once controls for the "social norm" effect
are included. This is perhaps unsurprising: being connected to peers who are prone to get in
trouble with other students establishes a social norm of acceptable "trouble-laden" behavior.
Table 17: Revised "Prosocial" Outcome Results using Peer-weighted Controls
Peer- Peer- Peer- Peer- Peer- Peer-
Peer- weighted weighted Peer- weighted weighted Peer- weighted weighted
Base weighted FE IV Base weighted FE IV Base weighted FE IV
Closure (m=2, k=2.0) 0.073 0.047 0.079 0.171 -0.046 -0.041 -0.045 -0.220 0.248 0.147 0.195 0.275
(4.67)** (3.74)** (8.12)** (3.05)** (5.99)** (5.91)** (6.86)** (6.75)** (6.09)** (4.13)** (10.91)** (2.77)**
Feelsafe (peer-weighted) 0.417 0.183 0.173
(12.14)** (9.07)** (7.66)**
Trouble (peer-weighted) 0.390 0.285 0.259
(12.73)** (16.81)** (9.86)**
GPA (peer-weighted) 0.370 0.385 0.415
(10.97)** (16.19)** (16.51)**
Size of Student's Class 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.007 -0.007 -0.004 0.029 0.025 -0.024 -0.025 -0.096 -0.092
(0.14) (0.18) (0.67) (1.07) (2.46)* (1.93) (6.58)** (2.98)** (1.67) (1.81) (4.55)** (4.36)**
Friend truncation controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Friend ftxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background/demographic
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fractionalization controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School ftxed-effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 62276 62276 62276 61833 66430 66430 66430 65945 61553 61553 61553 61083
R-squared/Log Likelihood -39292 -38819 0.01 -41614 -41330 0.03 0.14 0.17 0.13
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. All errors clustered at the school level. Probit (marginal effects) used for model (1) and (2); linear probability model used
for (3) and (4).
* signiftcant at 5%; ** signiftcant at 1%
00
tv
83
Without controlling for this influence, the apparent negative effect of being connected on
the likelihood of getting in trouble with other students will be attenuated, since the effect of
peer behavior works in the opposite direction. To the extent that my measure of peer behavior,
with direct-friend influence removed, can be considered plausibly exogenous, these results
show both an independent effect of connectedness, as well as confIrm evidence from the
peer effects literature that peer behavior influences outcomes (in particular student
performance as in Kremer and Levy (2008), but applied to a nationally representative sample
of high school students).48
The effect of closure on health behavior is fIrst explored in Table 18. Both for
smoking and drinking behavior, closure appears to have a signifIcant and robust effect on
individual health behavior. Higher closure (higher connectedness) appears to have a
negative effect on the likelihood of being a habitual smoker (three or more times per week),
and a lower likelihood of abstaining from alcohol while in high school (or at least for the
previous twelve months for high-school-aged students). If smoking is an anti-social
behavior, and drinking a prosocial behavior, these fIndings would be consistent with Allcott
et al. (2007)'s contention that closure has a positive effect on prosocial behavior.
These results, however, are contingent on the potentially strong assumption that the
instrument (average closure of connected individuals immediately adjacent to the researcher-
defmed circle of trust size K) is truly exogenous: to the extent that an individual's own friend
choice influences the choice of friends beyond this distance, endogeneity bias will remain.
Following Babcock (2008) and Clark and Loheac (2007), I utilize the panel structure of the
data and investigate the effect of lagged (iX1ave 1) closure and peer behavior on current
(iX1ave 3) outcomes. Table 19 presents results for smoking and drinking behavior, while
Table 20 presents results for educational attainment (likelihood of getting an undergraduate
4-year degree).49
48 More so for school perfonnance, the contemporaneous choice of friends with the decision to complete
homework assignments and engage in academic activities, could matter to the significance of closure on school
performance, if academic engagement is correlated with friend choice - a matter I investigate in Wave 3
specifications.
49 Educational attainment results are also included in this work; although the primary focus is on health
behavior, this work aims to also relate to the extant literature.
Table 18: Health Behavior Results using Peer-weighted Controls
Closure (m=2, k=2.0)
Smoking (peer-weighted)
Drinking (peer-weighted)
Size of Student's Class
Friend truncation controls
Friend fixed effects
Background/demographics
Fractionalization controls
School fixed-effects
observations
R-squared/Log Likelihood
,
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Peer- Peer- Peer- Peer-
Peer- weighted weighted Peer- weighted weighted
Base weighted FE IV Base weighted FE IV
-0.076 -0.037 -0.042 -0.094 -0.027 -0.029 -0.027 -0.127
(7.75)** (5.28)** (4.84)** (3.34)** (2.31)* (3.42)** (4.18)** (2.76)**
0.752 0.907 0.935
(23.04)** (18.81)** (19.98)**
0.755 0.642 0.669
(21.46)** (47.08)** (20.10)**
-0.004 -0.004 0.011 0.010· 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.001
(1.21) (2.75)** (2.41)* (2.11)* (1.60) (2.09)* (0.91) (0.29)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
69737 69737 69737 69192 65736 65736 65736 65257
-30789 -28349 0.10 -41998 -40517 0.08
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. All errors clustered at the school level. Probit (marginal effects) used for model
(1) and (2); linear probability model used for (3) and (4).
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Id Drinkin!!" R3Smoking-an
Smoking - Unconditional Smoking - Conditional on non- Drinking - Unconditional Drinking - Conditional on non-
smoking Wave 1 drinking Wave 1
(1) I (2) I (3) (1) I (2) I (3) (1) I (2) I (3) (1) I (2) I (3)
Table 19: W
Closure (m=2, k=2.0)
Peer-weighted Health Behavior
Base
0.015
(0.99)
Peer- Peer- Peer- Peer-
Peer- weighted Peer- weighted Peer- weighted Peer- weighted
weighted FE Base weighted FE Base weighted FE Base weighted FE
0.006 -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 -0.043 6.508 6.290 7.567 5.238 5.173 5.529
(0.47) (0.78) (0.39) (0.47) (1.51) (4.43)** (4.28)** (5.80)** (3.06)** (3.02)** (3.44)**
0.047 0.047 0.018 0.014 7.804 10.220 4.433 3.035
(5.6~ (3.92)** (2.79)** (2.10)* (2.41L (2.38~ (1.18) (0.80)
Observations
R-sguared/Log-Likelihood
12768
-7561.8
12768 12768 3241 3241 3241 12727 12727 12727 6620 6620 6620
-7500.7 0.05 -2040.8 -2036.3 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. All errors are clustered at the school level. Probit (marginal effects) used for model (1) and (2); linear probability model used
for (3).
* significant at 5''/0; ** significant at 1%
Table 20: Wave 3 Educational Attainment Results
I Bachelor Degree I
(1) I (2) I (3) I (4)
Closure (m=2, k=2.0)
Peer-weighted GPA
Base
0.037
(5.57)**
Peer-weighted Peer-weighted FE IV and FE
0.Q38 0.085 0.227
(5.58)** (7.70)** (3.74)**
-0.004 0.029 0.032
(0.81) (1.80) (1.()Q)
Observations 12778 12778 12778 12519
R-sguared/Log-Likelihood -3407.0 -3405.1 0.11 0.20
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. All errors are clustered at the school level. Probit (marginal effects) used for model (1) and (2); linear
probability model used for (3) and (4).
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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It is important to recognize that smoking behavior has a strong addictive component
to it. IfWave 1 influence is transmitted into Wave 3 behavior through the chain of cigarette
addiction over time, this identification strategy will fail. To a lesser extent, the same
concerns are warranted for drinking (here measured by the intensity of drinking: the number
of days in the prior year upon which five or more servings were consumed in one sitting).
To address this complication, I present both unconditional results for the full sample, as well
as conditional results. In particular, I condition on not smoking or drinking in Wave 1: this is
based upon the notion that peer influence and connectedness induce behavior which would
not have occurred otherwise. For those who did not engage in risky health behaviors in high
school, does having been "connected" and being around smoking or drinking peers in high
school influence the likelihood to smoke or excessively drink later in life?50
I fmd a strong and robustly significant effect of connectedness on drinking behavior
and educational attainment, but not for smoking behavior. Although peer effects seem to
matter for smoking behavior and educational attainment, this is not the case for the
conditional analysis and drinking behavior. There are several implications. First, the decision
to smoke - a plausibly anti-social behavior - does not seem to be influenced by the level of
connectedness early in life. For he who abstained from smoking early in life, the level of
interconnection between him and his peers seems to be irrelevant to his decision to smoke
later in life. This could be because the effect of social isolation on the individual
vulnerability to smoke is met early in life, or it could simply be that there is no effect at all.
Second, peer behavior seems to matter to drinking behavior when measured
contemporaneously, but not so (at least for non-drinkers in high school) later in life.
Drinking behavior is a rather established norm in American society for those older than high
school age. It could be that peer behavior establishes this norm (where it would otherwise
be absent) early in life, but is irrelevant later in life when a broader societal nonn kicks in.
50 I acknowledge that closure and peer behavior matters to the reverse - that they may affect the decision to
not smoke or drink in Wave 1, and that this decision could be correlated with unobserved individual
heterogeneity which could influence Wave 3 choices. This plausible impact should be taken as a caveat to any
implications claimed; in particular, \V'ave 3 estimations for smoking and drinking were run for N specifications
with and without school fixed effects; when both IV and fixed effects are included, closure no longer matters
to Wave 3 drinking behavior. This could be due to either correlated individual heterogeneity, or measurement
error in the degree of connectedness. The former would work against my findings, while the latter would
explain to some extent the drop in significance. As shown in Table 9, instrumentation and school fixed effects
do not remove significance for educational attainment, which is further supportive of f111dings reported in
Babcock (2008).
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Regardless, it would appear that connectedness matters to the decision to drink
heavily later in life, although the transmission of that effect remains unclear. An
instrumental variables specification (not reported) showed that the significance and
magnitude of the effect vanishes when endogenous effects are plausibly removed. I would
therefore interpret the effect of the degree of connectedness on Wave 3 drinking behavior as
potentially a result of the correlation between closure and the ability to make friends with
otherwise well interconnected people, which could increase access to opportunities for
excessive drinking.
The results for educational attainment are more concrete. It appears that the level of
connectedness matters to the choice to enter and complete college, this is a result already
documented in Babcock (2008), but I use closure as a different and more refmed measure
for connectedness. The Babcock study has better options for identification (using variation
within schools across grades), but relies on a rather coarse measure for connectedness. What
remains to be shown (in future work) is whether this effect is transmitted through peer
effects in the quality of early schooling, or connectedness. This work makes an initial
attempt to differentiate the two effects. However, since GPA performance in high school
could be correlated with the likelihood to complete a college degree later in life, I still take
these results as suggestive of an effect, but not establishing a causal relationship.
6. Conclusions
The idea of closure, first proposed in Mobius and Szeidl (2006), is an interesting idea.
However, the complicated process by which networks are developed creates real hurdles for
causal inference. This study has attempted to present more than suggestive evidence that
connectedness matters to individual behavior, but additional work is warranted on the
subject. There is some evidence presented here, where reasonable attempts at identification
have been made using an individual and non-aggregated approach, that both connectedness
and peer influence matter to an individual's propensity to engage in health risk behavior.
It appears that closure is related to excessive drinking, but the transmission of this
effect remains unclear. It is clear that smoking behavior is less influenced by connectedness
than is alcohol consumption. The decision to smoke seems to be more related to the
development of socially accepted norms of behavior. Though young adults are bombarded
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with the very real health implications of tobacco use, many still continue to engage in this
risky behavior. It seems plausible that if they have friends early in life who smoke, this could
have very real impacts on their own decisions to engage in this behavior.
Finally, I provide some evidence that connectedness matters to educational
attainment, in support of the prior literature. Though I use a measure of connectedness
which presumably captures, at least to some extent, the effect of individual and joint choice,
I have made reasonable attempts to remove these effects, and have included peer-level
behavior as an additional explanatory variable. This has the added benefit of distinguishing
effects and linking two in1portant literatures.
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Table 21: Number of Hospital Admissions by State by Year
AZ CA CO FL IA MA MD NJ NY PA TN WI
1989 59,566 12,710 16,396 19,237
1990 70,736 11,037 22,202 19,005 14,060
1991 73,436 9,194 16,938 13,109 24,242
1992 82,129 100,682 11,999 19,208 16,843 33,768
1993 54,459 4,410 81,635 9,951 16,491 28,136 7,683 33,646 25,830
1994 71,305 3,055 77,000 9,174 12,450 28,216 11,172 26,559 27,989
1995 11,108 72,305 4,190 65,184 7,131 11,480 29,703 12,411 23,359 13,484 23,730
1996 12,857 70,510 3,889 64,505 7,021 7,572 29,993 14,126 23,401 12,303 23,039
1997 9,576 73,614 7,151 56,785 7,061 9,940 24,351 18,826 25,476 15,869 15,501 21,895
1998 8,912 71,462 6,270 55,302 5,749 12,025 22,027 16,747 27,226 12,846 11,477 20,919
1999 9,999 71,773 5,737 53,797 7,646 11,215 19,361 9,885 25,424 10,151 9,302 19,350
2000 18,813 60,643 8,145 34,059 7,410 14,155 13,185 10,936 35,553 17,762 4,590 20,725
2001 12,108 83,295 7,770 29,661 4,955 12,775 10,823 8,575 27,198 11,448 5,617 10,193
Source: HCUP database, cifter sampling.
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Figure 8: Subjective risk of Cancer (all cancers grouped)
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Figure 7: Subjective risk of Alzheimer's Disease
KEY: solid lines = U.S. sample; dashed lines = Canadian sample
Attitudinal and Subjective Beliefs by _A.ge (moving average of age-wise medians,5 th and 95 th percentiles in raw data)
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Figure 12: Subjective risk of Stroke
Figure 11: Subjective risk of Respiratory Disease
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Figure 10: Subjective risk of Heart Attack/Disease
Figure 9: Subjective risk of Diabetes
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Figure 16: Room to Improve on Smoking (cut back)
Figure 15: Room to Improve on Seat Belt Use
80
80
improve_doc MA(+2sd)
improve_doc MA(mean)
improve_doc MA(-2sd)
la_air MA(+2sd)
la_atr MA(mean)
la_air MA(-2sd)
40 60
age of respondent, in years
r--................. -... ....... /
ta_alr MA(mean)
la_air MA(-2sd)
la_atr MA(+2sd)
improve_doc MA(mean)
improve_doc MA(-2sd)
improve_doc MA(+2sd)
------..
~\~
40 60
age of respondent, in years
/-.. ....... (~ .....--.. - --:--~4..("""'""'\.
---.., \-,~-- -'"\>-.---.-~- "'\,
- - - ~'~,.-
- 'I . .'""'" ",- -"./'_/ \--'-----'"/", ...~ '-
'-,
"
'-,
'-" ...../., .... -
20
20
'";"
LI)
'";"
LI)
o
LI) S<'"'I _~ ....._ ...... , -..- \ --. '" -~ \ .......
J '--,-,~ 'I I
' 'I r--_, /
'" "-
LI) I
. I~ I
' I
LI)
/-- /-
0--1 ......,',
~ '-J.... -... //-/'-~'
'"
Figure 14: Room to Improve on Doctor Visits
Figure 13: Subjecti'l'e risk of Traffic Accident
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Figure 20: Room to ImprO\-e 011 Alcohol (drink less)
Figure 19: Room to hnpro,"e on Exercise (more)
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Figure 18: Room to Impron 011 Diet (eat healthier)
Figure 17: Room to Improve 011 ,veight Qose weight)
Figure 21: ConfIdence in Diagnosis and Treatment Efficacy
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Figure 23: \VTP U.S. Males
WTP: 1/1,000,000 mort. risk red. (US males)
(sudden death, current period; income =$42K, r =0.05)
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Figure 22: WTP Canadian Males
WTP: 1/1,000,000 mort. risk red. (Cdn males)
(sudden death, current period; income = $42K, r = 0.05)
Fitted distribution of WTP estimates by gender (median, 5th and 9S tl1 percentiles; 1000 random draws of parameters)
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Figure 27: \Xryp US./Canadian Females
WTP: 1/1,000,000 mort. risk red. (females)
(sudden death, current period; income = $42K, r = 0.05)
Figure 26: \VTP US./Canadian Ivlales
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Figure 25: \VTP US. Females
Figure 24: \,lTP Canadian Females
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Figure 28: \/lfTP US/Canadian I'vIales (median case)
med WTP for a 1/1,000,000 reduction in mortality risk
(sudden death, current period; income =$42K, r =0.05)
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figure 30: WTTP u.~. 1\1a.les \\<1.th College
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Figure 29: WTP Canadian Males with College
Fitted distribution of \xlTP by education (median, 5'h and 95 th percentiles across 1000 random draws of parameters)
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WTP: 1/1,000,000 mort. risk red. (US males nocollege)
(sudden death, current period; income =$42K, r =0.05)
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Figure 34: WTP US./Canadia11 J\.'lales without College
WTP: 1/1,000,000 mort. risk red. (no college)
(sudden death, current period; income =$42K, r =0.05)
Figure 33: 'WTP US. IvIales without College
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Figure 32: WTP Canadian Males w-ithout College
Figure 31: WTP US./Canadian }\/Iales with College
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Figure 37: WfP U.S';Canadian i\fales without College (median case)
med WTP for a 1/1,000,000 reduction in mortality risk
(sudden death, current period; income = $42K, r = 0.05)
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Figure 36: WTP U.S. Males College/No College
Figure 35: \/:iTP Canadian i\Iales College/No College
WTP: 1/1,000,000 mort. risk red. (Cdn males)
(sudden death, current period; income = $42K, r = 0.05)
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Figure 39: \j\fTP U.S. Married Males
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Figure 38: WrTP Canadian i\1arried Males
WTP: 1/1,000,000 mort. risk red. (Cdn males marr.)
(sudden death, current period; income =$42K, r =0.05)
Fitted distribution of WTP by marital status (median, 5Th and 95 Th percentiles across 1000 random draws of parameters)
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Figure 43: wrp U.S./Canadian non-Married Males
Figure 42: WTP U.S. non-Married Males
WTP: 1/1,000,000 mort. risk red. (US males non-marr.)
(sudden death, current period; income = $42K, r = 0.05)
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WTP: 1/1,000,000 mort. risk red. (males)
(sudden death, current period; income = $42K, r = 0.05)
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Figure 41: WTP Canadian non-Married Males
Pigure 40: wrrp U.S';Canadian Married Males
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Figure 44: WTP Canadian Males - Married vs. non-Married
Figure 45: WTP US Males - Married vs. non-Married
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APPENDIXG
WTP EMPIRICAL RESULTS (WITH T STATISTICS)
Table 22: Empirical Results (with t-test statistics)
Modell Model 2 Model 3
u.s. CDNL1 u.s. CDNL1 u.s. CDNL1
Net income term (complex formula) .01285 .01258 .01287 .01031 .01429
(10.48)*** (3.85)*** (9.46)*** (2.81)*** (6.16)***
... X 1(female) .01047
(4.23)***
· .. X 1(mod low risk of this illness) .01572
(2.18)**
... X 1(high risk of this illness) -.00761
(2.56)**
... X 1(not confident in health care) .0185
(2.54)**
... X 1(confident in health care) .004833
(1.99)**
Illness Years: ilI1:s log (pdvit +1)
-27.13 -2.493 -47.37 -23.68 -57.53 -57.8
(4.71)*** (0.24) (5.44)*** (1.51) (3.83)*** (2.89)***
... Xl(female) 32.87
(3.11)***
... X 1(low risk of this illness) 35.98
(2.50)**
... X 1(mod low risk of this illness) 24.63
(1.84)*
... X 1(mod high risk of this illness) -14.48
(1.12)
· .. X 1(lugh risk of this illness) -33.71
(2.08)**
... X 1(mod. high opp. impr exercise) -30.87
(2.87)***
... X 1(high 0PP' impr exercise) -41.16
(3.84)***
· .. X 1(very low opp. impr smoking) 43.83
(2.68)***
... X 1(mod low opp. impr smoking) 187.3
(2.40)**
Recovered Years: ilI1:s log (pdvr/ +1)
-22.81 -7.764 -17.54 -7.952
(2.45)** (0.45) (1.87)* (0.45)
... X1(female) -67.88 44.76
(4.82)*** (1.87)*
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Table 22 (cont.) Modell Model 2 Model 3
U.S. CDN~ U.S. CDN~ U.S. CDN~
Lost Life Years: L1I1~s log (pdv1t +1)
-29.23 20.01 -428.1 -27.75 -443.5
(5.88)*** (2.20)** (2.65)*** (0.08) (2.87)***
... Xage 12.04 -5.734 27.48 -24.77
(1.86)* (0.40) (4.45)*** (9.1 0)***
.,. Xage2 -.08826 .1363 -.2769 .3654
(1.44) (0.96) (4.71)*** (8.05)***
22.82 36.44
... X 1(female) (2.06)** (1.90)*
-32.5 37.11
· .. X 1(college degree or more) (2.93)*** (2.02)**
35.94 -34.01
· .. X 1(non-married) (3.25)*** (1.78)*
66.8
· .. X 1~ow risk of this illness) (4.97)***
31.08
... X 1(mod low risk of this illness) (2.57)**
-44.3
... X 1(mod high risk of this illness) (3.67)***
-70.09
... X 1(high risk of this illness) (4.77)***
26.03
... X 1(not confident in health care) (2.19)**
-17.74 46.32
... X 1(confident in health care) (1.49) (2.20)**
-34.57
... X 1(have gone outside CDN plan) (1.77)*
-17.22
· .. X 1(very low opp. impr. doct. visits) (1.81)*
145.1 60.41 149.1
Squared: [ L1I1~s log (pdvit +1)J2 (1.80)* (0.36) (1.93)*
-4.919 .7678 -10.89 9.454
... Xage (1.51) (0.11) (3.50)*** (7.54)***
.04097 -.04427 .1123 -.1426
... X age2 (1.31) (0.63) (3.73)*** (6.46)***
31.14 28.06 -30.29 93.07
Interaction: (3.81)*** (1.87)* (2.96)*** (5.73)***
L1I1~s log (pdvi jA+1) X log (pdV(A +1)
Scenario Adjtistmetlt Controls:
.0008043
(Net income term) X overest. oflatency (6.54)***
206.8
8rr:s log (pdvi,A +1) X 1(benefit never) (4.66)***
8.399
8rr:s log (pdvijA+ I) X overest. of latency (8.95)***
Table 22 (cant.)
Ml ~s log (pdvl," + I) X 1(benefit never)
~IT~S log (pdvl," + I) X overest. oflatency
~IT~S log (pdv1t +1) XageX 1(benefit never)
~n:S log (pdvi/ +l)Xlog(pdvliA+1)
X overest. oflatency
~n:s log (pdviiA+1) Xlog (pdvliA+1) X a
ge
X 1(benefit never)
~n:s log (pdV(A +1)Xlog (pdvl/ +1) Xa
ge2
X 1(benefit never)
~n:s log (pdvi/ +1)
X overest. of life expectancy
~n:s log (pdV(A +1)
X overest. of life expectancy
U.S. Sample Seledion Controls:
Observations
Log-Likelihood
Modell
U.S. CDN ~
32,079
-16706.6
Model 2
U.S. CDN~
32,079
-16644.2
114
Model 3
U.S. CDN~
639.3
(4.17)***
11.86
(14.31 )***
-7.035
(2.77)***
-4.933
(4.43)***
-14.72
(4.18)***
.2216
(3.97)***
-1.918
(3.75)***
-.7151
(1.52)
3.936
(2.43)**
31,836
-15617.2
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